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Abstract. Information assurance applications built according to the MILS (Mul-
tiple Independent Levels of Security) architecture often contain information ﬂow
policies that are conditional in the sense that data is allowed to ﬂow between sys-
tem components only when the system satisﬁes certain state predicates. However,
existing speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation environments, such as SPARK Ada, used
to develop MILS applications can only capture unconditional information ﬂows.
Motivated by the need to better formally specify and certify MILS applications
in industrial contexts, we present an enhancement of the SPARK information
ﬂow annotation language that enables speciﬁcation, inferring, and compositional
checking of conditional information ﬂow contracts. We report on the use of this
framework for a collection of SPARK examples.
1 Introduction
National and international infrastructures as well as commercial services are increas-
ingly relying on complex distributed systems that share information with Multiple Lev-
els of Security (MLS). These systems often seek to coalesce information with mixed
security levels into information streams that are targeted to particular clients. For exam-
ple, in a national emergency response system, some data will be privileged (e.g., infor-
mation regarding availability of military assets, and deployment orders for those assets)
and some data will be public (e.g., weather and mapping information). In such systems
there is a huge tension between providing aggressive information ﬂow in order to gain
operational advantage while preventing the ﬂow of information to unauthorized parties.
Speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation of security policies and providing end-to-end guarantees
in this context is exceedingly difﬁcult.
The Multiple Independent Levels of Security (MILS) architecture [30] proposes to
make development, accreditation, and deployment of MLS-capable systems more prac-
tical, achievable, and affordable by providing a certiﬁed infrastructure foundation for
systems that require assured information sharing. In the MILS architecture, systems
are developed on top of: (a) a “separation kernel”, a concept due to Rushby [26] which
guarantees isolation and controlled communication between application components
deployed in different virtual “partitions” supported by the kernel, and (b) MILS middle-
ware services such as “high assurance guards” that allow information to ﬂow between
? This work was supported in part by the US National Science Foundation (NSF) awards
0454348, 0429141, and CAREER award 0644288, the US Air Force Ofﬁce of Scientiﬁc Re-
search (AFOSR), and Rockwell Collins. The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of
Rod Chapman in obtaining SPARK examples and running the SPARK tools.various partitions and between trusted and untrusted segments of a network only when
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Researchers at Rockwell Collins Advanced Technology Center (RC ATC) are in-
dustry leaders in certifying MILS components according to standards such as the Com-
mon Criteria (EAL 6/7) that mandate the use of formal methods. For example, RC ATC
engineers carried out the certiﬁcation of the hardware-based separation kernel in RC’s
AAMP7 processor (this was the ﬁrst such certiﬁcation of a MILS separation kernel
and it formed the initial draft of the Common Criteria Protection Proﬁle for Separation
Kernels) as well as the software-based kernel in the Green Hills Integrity 178B RTOS.
Seeking to leverage the groundbreaking work on the AAMP7 separation kernel,
Rockwell Collins product groups that include 200+ developers are building several dif-
ferent information assurance products on top of the AAMP7 following the MILS archi-
tecture. These products are programmed using the SPARK subset of Ada [7]. One of the
primary motivating factors for the use of SPARK is that it includes annotations (formal
contracts for procedure interfaces) for specifying and checking information ﬂow [11].
The use of these annotations plays a key role in the certiﬁcation cases for the prod-
ucts. The SPARK language and associated tool-set is the only commercial product that
we know of which can support checking of code-level information ﬂow contracts, and
SPARK provides a number of well-designed and effective capabilities for specifying
and verifying properties of implementations of safety-critical systems.
However, Rockwell Collins developers are struggling to provide precise arguments
for correctness in information assurance certiﬁcation due to several limitations of the
SPARK information ﬂow framework. A key limitation is that SPARK information ﬂow
annotations are unconditional (e.g., they capture such statements as “executing proce-
dure P may cause information to ﬂow from input variable X to output variable Y ”),
but MILS security policies are often conditional (e.g., data from partition A is only
allowed to ﬂow to partition B when state variables G1 and G2 satisfy certain con-
ditions). Thus, SPARK cannot capture nor support veriﬁcation of critical aspects of
MILS policies (treating such conditional ﬂows as unconditional ﬂows in SPARK is an
over-approximation that leads to many false alarms).
In previous work, Banerjee and the ﬁrst author have developed Hoare logics that
enable compositional reasoning about information ﬂow [3,2]. Inspired by challenge
problems from Rockwell Collins, this logic was extended to support conditional infor-
mation ﬂow [5]. While the logic as presented in [5] exposed some foundational issues,
it only supported intraprocedural analysis, it required developers to specify information
ﬂow loop invariants, the veriﬁcation algorithm was not yet fully implemented (and thus
no experience was reported), and the core logic was not mapped to a practical method
contract language capable of supporting compositional reasoning in industrial settings.
In this paper, we address these limitations by describing how the logic can provide
a foundation for a practical information ﬂow contract language capable of supporting
compositional reasoning about conditional information ﬂows. The speciﬁc contribu-
tions of our work are as follows:
– we propose an extension to SPARK’s information ﬂow contract language that sup-
ports conditional information ﬂow, and we describe how the logic of [5] can be
used to provide a semantics for the resulting framework,
– we extend the veriﬁcation generation rules of [5] to support procedure calls and
compositional checking,procedure MACHINE STEP
− −
− − INFORMATION FLOW CONTRACT GOES HERE
− − − − − see Figure 2 − − −
is
DATA 0, DATA 1 : CHARACTER;
begin
if IN 0 RDY and not OUT 1 RDY then
DATA 0 := IN 0 DAT ; IN 0 RDY := FALSE;
OUT 1 DAT := DATA 0; OUT 1 RDY := TRUE;
end if ;
if IN 1 RDY and not OUT 0 RDY then
DATA 1 := IN 1 DAT ; IN 1 RDY := FALSE;
OUT 0 DAT := DATA 1; OUT 0 RDY := TRUE;
end if ;
end MACHINE STEP;
Fig.1. Simple MILS Guard - mailbox mediates communication between partitions.
– we present a strategy for automatically inferring conditional information ﬂow in-
variants for while loops, thus signiﬁcantly reducing developers’ annotation burden,
– we provide an implementation that can both: (a) check method implementations
against information ﬂow contracts, and (b) automatically mine conditional infor-
mation ﬂow contracts from implementations, and
– we report on experiments applying the implementation to a collection of examples.
Recent efforts for certifying MILS separation kernels [16,18] used formal models
in ACL2 [21] or PVS [24] theorem provers that were developed by hand from source
code,andextensiveinspectionswererequiredbycertiﬁcationauthoritiestoestablishthe
validity of these manual steps. Because our approach is directly integrated with code,
it complements these earlier efforts by: (a) removing the “trust gaps” associated with
manuallybuildingandinspectingbehavioralmodels,and(b)allowingmanyveriﬁcation
obligations to be discharged earlier in the life cycle by developers while leaving only
the most complicated obligations to certiﬁcation teams. In addition, the logic-based
approach presented in this paper provides a foundation for producing independently
auditable and machine-checkable evidence (in the form of proofs within the logic) of
correctness and MILS policy satisfaction as recommended by the National Research
Council’s Committee on Certiﬁably Dependable Software Systems [20].
2 Example
Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual information ﬂows in a fragment of an idealized MILS
infrastructure component used by Rockwell Collins engineers to demonstrate speciﬁca-
tion and veriﬁcation of information ﬂow issues in MILS components running on top of
theAAMP7separationkernelforNSAandindustryrepresentatives.Thisdemonstration
was the ﬁrst iteration of what is now a much more sophisticated high assurance network
guard product line at Rockwell Collins. The “Mailbox” component in the center of the
diagram mediates communication between two client processes – each running on its
own partition in the separation kernel. Client 0 writes data to communicate in the mem-
ory segment Input 0 that is shared between Client 0 and the mailbox, then it sets the
Input 0 Ready ﬂag. The mailbox process polls its ready ﬂags; when it ﬁnds that, e.g.,
Input 0 Ready is set and Output 1 Ready is cleared (indicating that Client 1 has already
consumed data deposited in the Output 1 slot in a previous communication), then it
copies the data from Input 0 to Output 1 and clears Input 0 Ready and sets Output 1
Ready. The communication from Client 1 to Client 0 follows a symmetric set of steps.− −# global in out IN 0 RDY , IN 1 RDY ,
− −# OUT 0 RDY , OUT 1 RDY ,
− −# OUT 0 DAT , OUT 1 DAT;
− −# in IN 0 DAT , IN 1 DAT ;
− −# derives
− −# OUT 0 DAT from IN 1 DAT , OUT 0 DAT ,
− −# OUT 0 RDY , IN 1 RDY &
− −# OUT 1 DAT from IN 0 DAT , OUT 1 DAT ,
− −# IN 0 RDY , OUT 1 RDY &
− −# IN 0 RDY from IN 0 RDY , OUT 1 RDY &
− −# IN 1 RDY from INP 1 RDY , OUT 0 RDY &
− −# OUT 0 RDY from OUT 0 RDY , IN 1 RDY &
− −# OUT 1 RDY from OUT 1 RDY , IN 0 RDY ;
(a)
− −# . . .
− −# derives
− −# OUT 0 DAT from
− −# IN 1 DAT when ( IN 1 RDY and not OUT 0 RDY) ,
− −# OUT 0 DAT when ( not IN 1 RDY or OUT 0 RDY) ,
− −# OUT 0 RDY , IN 1 RDY &
− −# OUT 1 DAT from
− −# IN 0 DAT when ( IN 0 RDY and not OUT 1 RDY) ,
− −# OUT 1 DAT when ( not IN 0 RDY or OUT 1 RDY) ,
− −# OUT 1 RDY , IN 0 RDY
− −# . . . (b)
Fig.2. (a) SPARK information ﬂow contract for Mailbox example. (b) Fragment of
same example with proposed conditional information ﬂow extensions.
Figure 2(a) shows the SPARK Ada annotations for the MACHINE STEP procedure
(shown in Fig. 1, next to the diagram) of the Mailbox example that implements the
actions to be taken in each execution frame. SPARK derives annotations are used to
capture the information ﬂow properties of the example. It requires that each parameter
and each global variable referenced by the procedure be classiﬁed as in (read only),
out (written, and initial values [values at the point of procedure call] are unread), or
in out (written, and initial values read). For a procedure P, variables annotated as in
or in out are called input variables and denoted INP; while variables annotated as
out or in out are output variables and denoted as OUTP. Each output variable xo
must have a derives annotation indicating the input variables whose initial values
are used to directly or indirectly calculate the ﬁnal value of xo. One can also think of
each derives clause as expressing a dependence relation or program slice between an
output variable and the input variables that it transitively depends on (via both data
and control dependence). For example, the second derives clause speciﬁes that on
each MACHINE STEP execution the output value of OUT 1 DAT is possibly determined
by the input values of several variables: from IN 0 DAT when the Mailbox forwards
data supplied by Client 0, from OUT 1 DAT when the conditions on the ready ﬂags are
not satisﬁed (OUT 1 DAT’s output value then is its input value), and from OUT 1 RDY
and IN 0 RDY because these variables control whether or not data ﬂows from Client 0
on a particular machine step (i.e., they guard the ﬂow).
While upper levels of the MILS architecture require reasoning about lattices of se-
curity levels (e.g., unclassiﬁed, secret, top secret), the policies of infrastructure compo-
nents such as separation kernels and guard applications usually focus on data separation
policies (reasoning about ﬂows between components of program state), and we restrict
ourselves to such reasoning in this paper.
No other commercial language framework provides automatically checkable infor-
mation ﬂow speciﬁcations, so the use of the information ﬂow checking framework in
SPARK is a signiﬁcant step forward. As illustrated above, SPARK derives clauses
can be used to specify ﬂows of information from input variables to output variables, but
they do not have enough expressive power to state that information only ﬂows under
speciﬁc conditions. For example, in the Mailbox code, information from IN 0 DAT only
ﬂows to OUT 1 DAT when the ﬂag IN 0 RDY is set and OUT 1 READY is cleared, other-
wise OUT 1 DAT remains unchanged. In other words, the ﬂags IN 0 RDY and OUT 1 RDY
guard theﬂowofinformationthroughthemailbox.Unfortunately,theSPARK derives
cannotdistinguishtheﬂagvariablesasguardsnorphrasetheconditionsunderwhichthe
guards allow information to pass or be blocked. This means that guarding logic, whichExpressions
arithmetic
A ::= x | c | A op A | H[A]
array
H ::= h | Z | H{A : A}
boolean
B ::= A bop A
Assertions
φ ::= B | φ ∧ φ
| φ ∨ φ | ¬φ
Commands
S ::= skip
| x := A assignment
| S ;S sequential composition
| assert(φ) programmer asssertion
| call p procedure call
| if B then S else S conditional
| while B do S od iteration
| h := new array creation
| h[A] := A array update
Fig.3. Syntax of a simple imperative language
is central to many MLS applications including those developed at Rockwell Collins, is
completely absent from the checkable speciﬁcations in SPARK.
In general, the lack of ability to express conditional information ﬂow not only in-
hibits automatic veriﬁcation of guarding logic speciﬁcations, but also results in impre-
cision which cascades and builds throughout the speciﬁcations in the application.
3 Foundations of SPARK Conditional Information Flow
The SPARK subset of Ada is designed for programming and verifying safety critical
applications such as avionics applications certiﬁed to DO-178B Level A. It deliberately
omits constructs that are difﬁcult to reason about such as dynamically created data,
pointers, and exceptions. In Figure 3, we present the syntax of a simple imperative
language with assertions that one can consider to be an idealized version of SPARK.
We omit some features of SPARK that do not present conceptual challenges, such as
records, and the package and inheritance structure.
Referring to Figure 3, we consider three kind of expressions (E ∈ Exp): arithmetic
(A ∈ AExp), boolean (B ∈ BExp), and array expressions (H ∈ HExp). We use
x,y to range over scalar variables, h to range over array variables, and w,z to range
over both kind of variables; actual variables appearing in programs are depicted using
typewriter font. We also use c to range over integer constants, p to range over named
(parameterless) procedures, op to range over arithmetic operators in {+,×,mod,...},
and bop to range over comparison operators in {=,<,...}.
The use of programmer assertions is optional, but often helps to improve the preci-
sion of our analysis. For example, a loop while B do S od which is known to have in-
variantφ,maybetransformedintowhileB doassert(φ ∧ B) ;S od; assert(φ ∧ ¬B).
Using parameterless procedures simpliﬁes our exposition; our implementation sup-
ports procedures with parameters (there are no conceptual challenges in this extended
functionality).
The SPARK information ﬂow analysis treats arrays as atomic entities – a conserva-
tive approximation that makes analysis signiﬁcantly easier. In the SPARK analysis, any
information ﬂowing to/from a particular array element is treated as ﬂowing to/from all
elements of the array. Due to the lack of heap-allocated data in SPARK, complex data
structures are often implemented in arrays. For information assurance applications, the
SPARK treatment of information ﬂow for arrays can signiﬁcantly impede the ability to
verify interesting end-to-end information ﬂow properties. Our logic is designed so as to[[x]]s = s(x)
[[c]]s = c
[[H[A]]]s = [[H]]s([[A]]s)
[[A1 op A2]]s = [[A1]]s op [[A2]]s
[[h]]s = s(h)
[[Z]]s = λn.0
[[H{A0 : A}]]s = [[[H]]s | [[A0]]s7→[[A]]s]
[[A1 bop A2]]s = True iff [[A1]]s bop [[A2]]s
Fig.4. Semantics of expressions
allow us to reason about individual elements of arrays, thus giving more precision than
SPARK. The proofs and technical content in this paper support, for an intraprocedural
and loop-free setting, this more precise reasoning about arrays, even though our current
implementation (as reported on in Section 6) treats arrays as atomic entities, just as
SPARK does. Active ongoing work on reasoning about information ﬂow for individual
array elements includes (i) integrating it with procedure calls and while loops; (ii) in-
corporating it into our implementation; (iii) proposing ways of specifying it as part of
enhanced SPARK contracts.
To enable reasoning about individual array elements, in intermediate forms of the
assertions we shall need the constructs Z (denoting an initial array as created by the
command h := new) and H{A0 : A0} (denoting the array H updated such that index
A0 now has value A0). We shall demand, however, that programs (command) are pure,
where a a syntactic entity is pure if all array expressions that occur are array variables.
For an expression E, we write fv(E) for the variables occurring free in E which is
the union of the free scalar variables fsv(E) and the free array variables fav(E), and
write E[A/x] (or E[H/h]) for the result of substituting in E all occurrences of x by
A (or h by H). We use similar notations for assertions φ, where as usual we deﬁne
φ1 → φ2 as ¬φ1 ∨ φ2, and also deﬁne true as 0 = 0, and false as 0 = 1.
Semantics: We model an array as a mapping (a ∈ Array) from integers to values,
where a value (v ∈ Val) is an integer n; we write [a | n7→v] for the array that is like
a except that it maps n into v. To keep the exposition simple, we shall ignore bounds
and range checks, and assume that an array reference a(n) is always well-deﬁned. A
store s ∈ Store maps scalar variables to values, and array variables to arrays; we write
dom(s) for the domain of s and write [s | x7→v] for the store that is like s except that
it maps x into v, write [s | h7→a] for the store that is like s except that it maps h into a,
and write [s | h(n)7→v] for [s | h7→[h | n7→v]].
The semantics of expressions is deﬁned recursively in Fig. 4. For an arithmetic
expression A, the semantics [[A]] is a function from stores into values; similarly, [[B]]s
denotes a boolean, and [[H]]s denotes an array.
The satisfaction relation for assertions reads s |= φ and denotes that φ holds in s.
The deﬁnition is inductive in φ: s |= B iff [[B]]s = True; s |= φ1 ∧ φ2 iff s |= φ1 and
s |= φ2, etc. We deﬁne φ and φ0 to be 1-equivalent, written φ ≡1 φ0, if for all s it holds
that s |= φ iff s |= φ0. Similarly, “φ 1-implies φ0”, written φ B1 φ0, when φ logically
implies φ0. In Appendix (p. 35), we prove the following result:
Lemma 1. Given φ, we can construct pure φ0 such that φ ≡1 φ0.
A command transforms the store into another store; hence its semantics is given in
relational style, in the form s [[S]] s0. The semantics is given in Fig. 5, and deﬁned
inductively on S; implicitly we assume a global procedure environment P that for each
p returns a relation between input and output stores (we expect that if s P(p) s0 then,
with S the body of p, we have s [[S]] s0). For some S and s, there may not exist any s0
such that s [[S]] s0; this can happen if a while loop does not terminate, or an assert
fails.s [[skip]] s
0 iff s
0 = s
s [[x := A]] s
0 iff ∃v : v = [[A]]s and s
0 = [s | x7→v]
s [[S1 ;S2]] s
0 iff ∃s
00 : s [[S1]] s
00 and s
00 [[S2]] s
0
s [[assert(φ)]] s
0 iff s |= φ and s
0 = s
s [[call p]] s
0 iff s P(p) s
0
s [[if B then S1 else S2]] s
0 iff ([[B]]s = True and s [[S1]] s
0)
or ([[B]]s = False and s [[S2]] s
0)
s [[while B do S od]] s
0 iff ∃i ≥ 0 : s fi s
0 where fi is inductively deﬁned by:
s f0 s
0 iff [[B]]s = False and s
0 = s
s fi+1 s
0 iff ∃s
00 : ([[B]]s = True and
s [[S]] s
00 and s
00 fi s
0)
s [[h[A0] := A]] s
0 iff ∃n,v : n = [[A0]]s, v = [[A]]s and s
0 = [s | h(n)7→v]
s [[h := new]] s
0 iff s
0 = [s | h7→λn.0]
Fig.5. Command semantics
Reasoning about information ﬂow in terms of non-interference: MILS seeks to pre-
vent security breaches that can occur via unauthorized/unintended information ﬂow
from one partition to another; thus previous certiﬁcation efforts for MILS components
have among the core requirements included the classical property of non-interference
[15] which (in this setting) states: for every pair of runs of a program, if the runs agree
on the initial values of one partition’s data (but may disagree on the data of other parti-
tions) then the runs also agree on the ﬁnal values of that partition’s data.
Capturing non-interference and secure information ﬂow in a compositional logic:
The logic developed in [3] was designed to verify speciﬁcations of the following form:
given two runs of P that initially agree on variables x1 ...xn, the runs agree on vari-
ablesy1 ...ym attheendoftheruns.Thisincludesnon-interferenceasaspecialcase,as
can be seen by letting x1 ...xn, and y1 ...ym, be the variables of one partition. We may
express such a speciﬁcation, which makes the “end-to-end” aspect of verifying conﬁ-
dentiality explicit, in Hoare-logic style as {x1n,...,xnn} P {y1n,...,ymn}, where
the agreement assertion xn is satisﬁed by a pair of states, s1 and s2, if s1(x) = s2(x).
With P the example program from Sect. 2, we would have, e.g.,
{INP 1 DATn, OUT 0 DATn, INP 1 RDYn, OUT 0 RDYn} P {OUT 0 DAT}.
To captureconditionalinformation ﬂow,recent work[5] by Banerjee and theﬁrst author
introduced conditional agreement assertions, also called 2-assertions. They are of the
form φ ⇒ En which is satisﬁed, intuitively, by a pair of stores if either at least one of
them does not satisfy φ, or they agree on the value of E. We use θ ∈ 2Assert to range
over 2-assertions, and deﬁne s & s1 |= θ by:
s & s1 |= φ ⇒ En iff whenever s |= φ and s1 |= φ then [[E]]s = [[E]]s1.
For θ = (φ ⇒ En), we call φ the antecedent of θ and write φ = ant(θ), and we call
E the consequent of θ and write E = con(θ). We often write En for true ⇒ En. We
use Θ ∈ P(2Assert) to range over sets of 2-assertions (where we often write θ for the
singleton set {θ}), with conjunction implicit. Thus, s&s1 |= Θ iff ∀θ ∈ Θ : s&s1 |= θ.
Fig. 6 depicts a simple derivation using conditional information ﬂow assertions that
answersthequestion:whatisthesourceofinformationﬂowingintovariable OUT 0 DAT?
The natural way to read the derivation is from the bottom up (this is the way our al-
gorithm actually generates the derivation). Thus, for OUT 0 DATn to hold after exe-
cution of P, we must have DATA 1n before line 3 (since data ﬂows from DATA 1 to{INP 1 RDY ∧ ¬OUT 0 RDY ⇒ INP 1 DATn,
¬INP 1 RDY ∨ OUT 0 RDY ⇒ OUT 0 DATn,
INP 1 RDYn, OUT 0 RDYn}
1. if INP 1 RDY and not OUT 0 RDY then
{INP 1 DATn}
2. DATA 1 := INP 1 DAT; INP 1 RDY := false;
{DATA 1n}
3. OUT 0 DAT := DATA 1; OUT 0 RDY := true;
{OUT 0 DATn}
4. ﬁ
{OUT 0 DATn}
Fig.6. A derivation for the mailbox example, illustrating the handling of conditionals.
OUT 0 DAT), INP 1 DATn before line 2 (since data ﬂows from INP 1 DAT to DATA 1),
and ﬁnally INP 1 RDYn and OUT 0 RDYn (since they control which branch of the con-
dition is taken), along with conditional assertions. The pre-condition shows that the
value of OUT 0 DAT depends unconditionally on INP 1 RDY and OUT 0 RDY, and con-
ditionally on INP 1 DAT and OUT 0 DAT, just as we would expect.
Relations between agreement assertions: We deﬁne Θ B2 Θ0, pronounced “Θ 2-
implies Θ0”, to hold iff for all s,s1: whenever s&s1 |= Θ then also s&s1 |= Θ0. Θ
and Θ0 are 2-equivalent, written Θ ≡2 Θ0, iff Θ B2 Θ0 and Θ0 B2 Θ. In develop-
ment terms, when Θ B2 Θ0 holds we can think of Θ as a reﬁnement of of Θ0, and
Θ0 an abstraction of Θ. For example, {xn, yn} reﬁnes xn by adding an (uncondi-
tional) agreement assertion, and y < 10 ⇒ xn reﬁnes y < 7 ⇒ xn by weakening
the antecedent of a 2-assertion. In general, logical implication on 1Assert conditions
in agreement assertions is related in a contravariant manner to logical implication in
agreement assertions; this is a special case (with E = E0) of the following result:
Lemma 2. Assume that (a) φ B1 φ0, and (b) whenever s |= φ and s1 |= φ and
[[E0]]s = [[E0]]s1 then also [[E]]s = [[E]]s1. Then (φ0 ⇒ E0n) B2 (φ ⇒ En).
Proof: Assuming (i) s&s1 |= φ0 ⇒ E0n and (ii) s |= φ and s1 |= φ, we must prove
[[E]]s = [[E]]s1. By (a), we infer from (ii) that s |= φ0 and s1 |= φ0, which by (i) implies
[[E0]]s = [[E0]]s1. By (b), we get the desired [[E]]s = [[E]]s1. 2
We deﬁne a function decomp that converts arbitrary 2-assertions into assertions with
only variables as consequents: decomp(Θ) = {φ ⇒ wn | φ ⇒ En ∈ Θ,w ∈ fv(E)}.
Fact 3 For all Θ, decomp(Θ) is a reﬁnement of Θ.
The converse does not hold; for example we do not have {(x + y)n} B2 {xn,yn}
since we might have s&s1 |= (x + y) but not s&s1 |= x or s&s1 |= y, as when
s(x) = s1(y) = 3, s(y) = s1(x) = 7.
The following result is useful to reﬁne 2-assertions while removing non-pure con-
structs from their consequents (a 2-assertion φ ⇒ Z[A]n is reﬁned by any Θ).
Lemma 4. A 2-assertion φ ⇒ H{A0 : A0}[A]n is reﬁned by Θ = {θ1,θ2,θ3} where
θ1 = (φ ∧ A = A0) ⇒ A0n
θ2 = (φ ∧ A 6= A0) ⇒ H[A]n
θ3 = φ ⇒ (A = A0)nProof: Assumings&s1 |= Θ ands |= φands1 |= φ,wemustprove[[H{A0 : A0}[A]]]s =
[[H{A0 : A0}[A]]]s1. From s&s1 |= θ3 we have [[A = A0]]s = [[A = A0]]s1. There are
now two cases:
[[A]]s = [[A0]]s: Then also [[A]]s1 = [[A0]]s1, showing s |= A = A0 and s1 |= A = A0.
From s&s1 |= θ1 we thus infer [[A0]]s = [[A0]]s1, which amounts to the claim.
[[A]]s 6= [[A0]]s: Then also [[A]]s1 6= [[A0]]s1, showing s |= A 6= A0 and s1 |= A 6= A0.
From s&s1 |= θ2 we thus infer [[H[A]]]s = [[H[A]]]s1, which amounts to the claim.
2
Note that in Lemma 4, the converse direction does not hold: for example, we might have
s&s1 |= h{x : 7}[y]n but not s&s1 6|= (y = x)n, as when s(y) = 3 and s(x) = 3,
and s1(y) = 5 and s1(x) = 4 and s1(h) = a1 where a1(5) = 7. We conjecture that for
an impure 2-assertion φ, in general there does not exist a pure 2-assertion φ0 which is
2-equivalent to φ.
4 Conditional Information Flow Contracts
4.1 Foundations of ﬂow contracts
The syntax of a SPARK derives annotation for a procedure P (as illustrated in Fig-
ure 2(a)) can be represented formally as a relation DP between OUTP and P(INP). A
particular clause derives(z, ¯ w) ∈ DP declares that the ﬁnal value of output variable
z depends on the input values of variables ¯ w = w1,...,wk. The correctness of such
a clause as a contract for P can be expressed in terms of the logic of the preceding
section, as requiring the triple { ¯ wn} S {zn} where S is the body of procedure P and
where ¯ wn is a shorthand for {w1n,...,wkn}.
Because DP contains multiple clauses (one for each output variable of P), it cap-
tures multiple “channels” of information ﬂow through P. Therefore, we cannot simply
describethesemanticsofamulti-clausederivescontract{derives(z, ¯ w),derives(x, ¯ y)}
as {( ¯ w¯ y)n} S {zn,xn} because this would confuse the dependencies associated with
z and x, i.e., it would allow z to depend on ¯ y. Accordingly, the full semantics of SPARK
derives contracts is supported by what we term a multi-channel version of the logic
which is extended to include indexed agreement assertions znc indexed by a channel
identiﬁer c – which one can usually associate with a particular output variable to specify
the ﬂows/channel associated with a speciﬁc derives clause. In the multi-channel logic,
the confused triple above can now be correctly stated as { ¯ wnz, ¯ ynx} S {znz,xnx}.
The algorithm to be given in Sect. 5 extends to the multi-channel version of the logic in
a straightforward manner; hence the implementation described subsequently supports
the multi-channel version of the logic. For notational simplicity, we continue the dis-
cussion of the semantics of contracts using the single-channel version of the logic.
We now give a more convenient notation for triples of the form {Θ}P{Θ0}. This
will provide a formal interpretation for method contracts that capture conditions of
ﬂows from beginning to end of a method P. A ﬂow judgement κ is of the form Θ;Θ0,
with Θ the precondition and with Θ0 the postcondition. We say that Θ;Θ0 is valid for
command S, written S |=Θ;Θ0, if whenever s1&s2 |=Θ and s1[[S]]s0
1 and s2 [[S]] s0
2
then also s0
1&s0
2 |= Θ0 (if the 2-assertions in the precondition hold for input states s1
and s2, the postcondition must also hold for associated output states s0
1 and s0
2).4.2 Language design for conditional SPARK contracts
The logic of the preceding section is potentially much more powerful than what we
actually want to expose to developers – instead, we view it as a “core calculus” in
which information ﬂow reasoning is expressed. Our design goals that determine how
much of the power of the logic we wish to expose to developers in enhanced SPARK
conditional information ﬂow contracts are: (1) the effort required to write the contracts
should be as simple as possible, (2) the contracts should be able to capture common
idioms of MILS information guarding, (3) the contract checking framework should be
compositional to support MILS goals, and (4) there should be a natural progression
(e.g., via formal reﬁnements) from unconditional derives statements to conditional
statements.
Simplifying assertions: The agreement assertions from the logic of Sect. 3 have the
form φ ⇒ En. Here E is an arbitrary expression (not necessarily a variable), whereas
SPARK derives statements are phrased in terms of IN/OUTvariables only. We believe
that including arbitrary expressions in SPARK conditional derives statements would
add signiﬁcant complexity for developers, and our experimental studies have shown
that little increase in precision would be gained by such an approach. Instead, we retain
the use of expression-based assertions φ ⇒ En only during intermediate (automated)
steps of the analysis, and appealing to Fact 3, we have a canonical way of strengthening
φ ⇒ En to φ ⇒ w1n,...,φ ⇒ wkn where w1,...,wk ∈ fv(E) for contracts at pro-
cedure boundaries. A second simpliﬁcation relates to the fact that the core logic allows
both pre- and post-conditions to be conditional (e.g., {φ1 ⇒ E1n} P {φ2 ⇒ E2n}
where φ1 and φ2 represent different conditions). Based on discussions with developers
at Rockwell Collins and initial experiments, we believe that this would expose too much
power/complexity to developers leading to unwieldy contracts and confusion about the
underlying semantics. Accordingly, we are currently pursuing an approach in which
only preconditions can be conditional. Combining these two simpliﬁcations, SPARK
derives clauses are extended to allow conditions on input variables as follows:
derives z from w1 when φ1, ..., wk when φk
Here φ1 ...φk are boolean expressions on the pre-state of the associated procedure P.
Thus, the above speciﬁcation can be read as “The value of variable z at the conclusion
of executing P (for any ﬁnal state s0) is derived from wj when φj holds in the pre-
state s from which s0 is computed (if also φi holds in s, then z depends also on wi).”
Additional syntactic sugar can be introduced to simplify the contract notation, e.g.,
when input variables are conditioned (guarded) using the same expression. Figure 2(b)
shows how this can be used to specify conditional ﬂows for procedure MACHINE STEP
in Fig. 1.
Design methodology separating guard logic from ﬂow logic: The lack of conditional
assertions in post-conditions has the potential to introduce imprecision. Yet, we believe
the above approach to conditional expressions can be effective for the following reason:
we have observed that information assurance application design tends to factor out the
guarding logic (i.e., the pieces of state and associated state changes that determine
when information can ﬂow) from the code which propagates information. This follows
a common pattern in embedded systems in which the control logic is often factored out
from data computation logic.
This informal design strategy can be ﬁrmed up and presented as an effective design
methodology: some procedures act to modify the conditions under which informationﬂows (the guard logic) while other procedures actually realize the ﬂows for a particu-
lar value of the guard state. This could be enhanced by an explicit declaration of the
guard state, i.e., declaration of the program variables that can be observed by guards.
Guard state variables would be modiﬁed in guard logic procedures, but not be modi-
ﬁed in any procedure that declares conditions based on those guards. SPARK’s existing
IN/OUTvariable annotations can capture this requirement (no variable appearing in a
condition can be in OUT).
Contractabstractionandreﬁnement:Forapracticaldesignanddevelopmentmethod-
ology, it is important to consider notions of contract abstraction (generalization) and
reﬁnement – ideally, conditional contracts should be a reﬁnement of unconditional con-
tracts. For example, we believe it will be easier to introduce conditional contracts into
workﬂows if developers can: (1) make a rough cut at specifying information ﬂows with-
out conditions, and (2) systematically reﬁne to produce conditional contracts. In addi-
tion, in situations where developers have trouble capturing ﬂow policies, they can state
ﬂows without conditions and expert veriﬁcation engineers can later reﬁne those into
conditional contracts. Conversely, it is important for managers to understand that they
are not locked into our emerging technology; if they decide not to pursue a veriﬁcation
approachbasedonconditionalSPARKcontracts,theycansafelyabstractallconditional
contracts back to unconditional contracts.
We now establish the desired notion of contract reﬁnement (in terms of the general
underlying calculus instead of its limited exposure in SPARK), by deﬁning a relation
between ﬂow judgements: κ1 Bκ κ2, pronounced “κ1 reﬁnes κ2”, to hold iff for all
commands S, whenever S |= κ1 then also S |= κ2.
To gain the proper intuition about contract reﬁnement, it is important to note that
the reﬁnement relation is contra-variant in the pre-condition and co-variant in the post-
condition: given κ1 ≡Θ1;Θ0
1 and κ2 ≡Θ2;Θ0
2, if Θ2 B2 Θ1 and Θ0
1 B2 Θ0
2 then
κ1 Bκ κ2. For example, xn ; yn Bκ xn,yn ; yn holds because xn,yn B2
xn(Section3).Intuitively,thiscapturesthefactthatacontractcanalwaysbeabstracted
to a weaker one by stating that the output variables may depend on additional input vari-
ables. This illustrates that our contracts capture “may” dependence modalities: output
y may depend on both inputs x and y, but a reﬁnement xn ; yn shows that output
y need not depend on input y (the contract before reﬁnement is an over-approximation
of dependence information. Also, we have (y<7 ⇒ xn; zn)Bκ(xn;zn) which
realizes our design goals of achieving: (a) a formal reﬁnement by adding conditions to
a contract, and (b) a formal (safe) abstraction by removing conditions.
5 A Precondition Generation Algorithm
We deﬁne in Fig. 7 an algorithm Pre for inferring preconditions from postconditions.
We write {Θ} (R) ⇐= S {Θ0} when, given command S and postcondition Θ0, Pre
returns a precondition Θ for S that is designed so as to be sufﬁcient to establish Θ0 and
a relation R that associates each 2-assertion θ ∈ Θ0 with the 2-assertions in Θ needed
to establish θ. R captures dependences between variables before and after the execution
of S, and it also supports reasoning about multiple channels of information ﬂow as
discussed in Sect. 4.1, e.g., if {y1y2nx,y1y3nz} S {xnx,znz} then R will relate y1
to x and to z, y2 to x, and y3 to z. More precisely, we have R ⊆ Θ × {m,u} × Θ0
where tags m,u are mnemonics for “modiﬁed” and “unmodiﬁed”; if (θ,u,θ0) ∈ R then
additionally it holds that S modiﬁes no “relevant” variable, where a “relevant” variable{Θ} (R)⇐= skip {Θ
0} iff R = {(θ,u,θ) | θ ∈ Θ
0} and Θ = Θ
0
{Θ} (R)⇐= assert(φ0) {Θ
0} iff R={((φ ∧ φ0) ⇒ En,u,φ ⇒ En) | φ ⇒ En∈Θ
0} and Θ=dom(R)
{Θ} (R)⇐= x := A {Θ
0} iff R = {(φ[A/x] ⇒ E[A/x]n,γ,φ ⇒ En) | φ ⇒ En ∈ Θ
0},
where γ = m iff x ∈ fv(E) and Θ = dom(R)
{Θ} (R)⇐= h[A0] := A {Θ
0} iff R = {(φ[h{A0 : A}/h] ⇒ E[h{A0 : A}/h]n,γ,φ ⇒ En) | φ ⇒ En ∈ Θ
0}
where γ = m iff h ∈ fv(E) and Θ = dom(R)
{Θ} (R)⇐= h := new {Θ
0} iff R = {(φ[Z/h] ⇒ E[Z/h]n,γ,φ ⇒ En) | φ ⇒ En ∈ Θ
0}
where γ = m iff h ∈ fv(E) and Θ = dom(R)
{Θ} (R)⇐= S1 ;S2 {Θ
0} iff {Θ
00} (R2)⇐= S2 {Θ
0} and {Θ} (R1)⇐= S1 {Θ
00}
and R={(θ,γ,θ
0) | ∃θ
00,γ1,γ2 : (θ,γ1,θ
00)∈R1, (θ
00,γ2,θ
0)∈R2}, where γ = m iff γ1=m or γ2=m
{Θ} (R)⇐= if B then S1 else S2 {Θ
0}
iff {Θ1} (R1)⇐= S1 {Θ
0} , {Θ2} (R2)⇐= S2 {Θ
0} , R = R
0
1 ∪ R
0
2 ∪ R
0
0 ∪ R0, and Θ = dom(R),
where R
0
1 = {((φ1 ∧ B) ⇒ E1n,m,θ
0) | θ
0 ∈ Θ
0
m, (φ1 ⇒ E1n, ,θ
0) ∈ R1}
and R
0
2 = {((φ2 ∧ ¬B) ⇒ E2n,m,θ
0) | θ
0 ∈ Θ
0
m, (φ2 ⇒ E2n, ,θ
0) ∈ R2}
and R
0
0 = {(((φ1 ∧ B) ∨ (φ2 ∧ ¬B)) ⇒ Bn,m,θ
0)
| θ
0 ∈ Θ
0
m, (φ1 ⇒ E1n, ,θ
0) ∈ R1,(φ2 ⇒ E2n, ,θ
0) ∈ R2}
and R0 = {(((φ1 ∧ B) ∨ (φ2 ∧ ¬B)) ⇒ En,u,θ
0)
| θ
0 ∈ Θ
0
u, (φ1 ⇒ En,u,θ
0) ∈ R1,(φ2 ⇒ En,u,θ
0) ∈ R2}
and Θ
0
m = {θ
0 ∈ Θ
0 | ∃( ,m,θ
0) ∈ R1 ∪ R2} and Θ
0
u = Θ
0 \ Θ
0
m
{Θ} (R)⇐= call p {Θ
0}
iff R = Ru ∪ R0 ∪ Rm and Θ = dom(R),
where Ru = {(rm
+
OUTp(φ) ⇒ En,u,φ ⇒ En) | (φ ⇒ En) ∈ Θ
0 ∧ fv(E) ∩ OUTp = ∅}
and R0 = {(rm
+
OUTp(φ) ⇒ wn,m,φ ⇒ En)
| (φ ⇒ En) ∈ Θ
0 ∧ fv(E) ∩ OUTp 6= ∅ ∧ w ∈ fv(E) ∧ w / ∈ OUTp}
and Rm = {(rm
+
OUTp(φ) ∧ φ
z
w ⇒ zn,m,φ ⇒ En)
| (φ ⇒ En)∈Θ
0 ∧ w∈fv(E) ∩ OUTp ∧ φ
z
w ⇒ zn among preconditions for wn in p’s summary }
{Θ} (R)⇐= while B do S0 od {Θ
0}
iff R = Ru ∪ Rm and Θ = dom(R),
where for each w ∈ X (with X the variables “involved”) we inductively in i deﬁne φ
i
w, Θ
i, R
i, ψ
i
w by
φ
0
w =
W
{φ | ∃E : (φ ⇒ En)∈Θ
0 ∧ w∈fv(E)}, Θ
i={φ
i
w ⇒ wn | w∈X}, { } (R
i)⇐= S0 {Θ
i}
ψ
i
w =
W
{φ | ∃(φ ⇒ En, , ) ∈ R
i with w ∈ fv(E)
or w ∈ fv(B) and ∃(θ,m,θ
0) ∈ R
i with φ = ant(θ) or φ = ant(θ
0)}
φ
i+1
w = if ψ
i
w B1 φ
i
w then φ
i
w else φ
i
w 5 ψ
i
w
and j is the least i such that Θ
i=Θ
i+1
and Ru={(φ ⇒ En,u,θ
0)|θ
0∈Θ
0
u,E=con(θ
0),(fv(E)=∅,φ=true)∨(fv(E)6=∅,φ=
W
w∈fv(E)(φ
j
w))}
and Rm={(θ,m,θ
0) | θ
0 ∈ Θ
0
m ∧ θ ∈ Θ
j ∪ {true ⇒ 0n}}
and Θ
0
m={θ
0 ∈ Θ
0 | ∃w ∈ fv(con(θ
0)) : ∃( ,m, ⇒ wn) ∈ R
j} and Θ
0
u = Θ
0 \ Θ
0
m
Fig.7. The Precondition Generator
is one occurring in the consequent of θ0. We use γ to range over {m,u}, and write
dom(R) = {θ | ∃(θ, , ) ∈ R} and ran(R) = {θ0 | ∃( , ,θ0) ∈ R}.
Correctness results: If {Θ} ( )⇐= S {Θ0} then Θ is indeed a precondition (but not
necessarily the weakest such) that is strong enough to establish Θ0, as stated by:
Theorem 1 (Correctness). Assume {Θ} ( )⇐= S {Θ0} . Then S |= Θ;Θ0. That is,
if s&s1 |= Θ, and s0,s0
1 are such that s [[S]] s0 and s1 [[S]] s0
1, then s0&s0
1 |= Θ0.
Note that Theorem 1 is termination-insensitive; this is not surprising given our choice
of a relational semantics (but see [4] for a logic-based approach that is termination-sensitive). Also note that correctness is phrased directly wrt. the underlying semantics,
unlike [3,2] which ﬁrst establish the semantic soundness of a logic and next provide
a sound implementation of that logic. Theorem 1 is proved in Appendix (p. 41), much
as the corresponding result [5] (that handled a language with heap manipulation but
without procedure calls and without automatic computation of loop invariants), by es-
tablishing some auxiliary properties that have largely determined the design of Pre.
The ﬁrst such property is a variant of the “*-property” by Bell and La Padula [10], also
called “write conﬁnement” [6], which is used to preclude, e.g., “low writes under high
guards”. In our setting, it captures the role of the u tag and reads as follows:
Lemma 5. Assume {Θ} (R) ⇐= S {Θ0} . Then dom(R) = Θ and ran(R) = Θ0.
Given θ0 ∈ Θ0, there exists at most one θ such that (θ,u,θ0) ∈ R. If there exists such
θ, then con(θ) = con(θ0), and with E = con(θ) we have that if s [[S]] s0 then s agrees
with s0 on fv(E).
Lemma 5, proved in Appendix (p. 38), is needed in the proof of Theorem 1 to handle
the case where the two runs in question follow different branches in a conditional, as
we must then ensure that neither run modiﬁes a variable on which we want the two
runs to agree afterwards. We shall also use a lemma, proved in Appendix (p. 39), which
expresses that there will always be one applicable condition in the precondition:
Lemma 6. Assume {Θ} (R) ⇐= S {Θ0} . Given θ0 ∈ Θ0, there exists (θ, ,θ0) ∈ R
such that whenever s [[S]] s0 and s0 |= ant(θ0) then s |= ant(θ).
Intraprocedural analysis: We now explain the various clauses of Pre in Fig. 7, where
the clause for skip is trivial. For an assignment x := A, each 2-assertion φ ⇒ En in
Θ0 produces exactly one 2-assertion in Θ, given by substituting A for x (as in standard
Hoare logic) in φ as well as in E; the connection is tagged m when x occurs in E. For
example, if S is x := w then R might contain the triplets (y > 4 ⇒ wn,m,y > 4 ⇒
xn) and (w > 3 ⇒ zn,u,x > 3 ⇒ zn).
The rule for h[A0] := A captures that semantically, such an update is really an
assignment h := h{A0 : A} and can therefore be treated just as an assignment [17]:
for each 2-assertion φ ⇒ En in Θ0, we substitute h{A0 : A} for h, and tag the
connection m only when h occurs in E. (One could imagine a more precise rule which,
e.g., for command h[1] := 7 would allow postcondition true ⇒ h[2]n to be tagged
u; to prove the soundness of such a rule, we would need a more complex statement of
Lemma 5.) The rule for h := new similarly captures that this a really an assignment
h := Z.
The rule for S1 ;S2 works backwards, ﬁrst computing S2’s precondition which is
then used to compute S1’s; the tags express that a consequent is modiﬁed iff it has been
modiﬁed in either S1 or S2. The rule for assert allows us to weaken 2-assertions, by
strengthening their antecedents; this is sound since execution will abort from stores not
satisfying the new antecedents.
To illustrate and motivate the rule for conditionals, we shall use Fig. 6 where, given
postcondition OUT 0 DATn, the then branch generates (as the domain of R1) precon-
dition INP 1 DATn which by R0
1 contributes the ﬁrst conditional assertion of the overall
precondition. The skip command in the implicit else branch generates (as the domain
of R2) precondition OUT 0 DATn which by R0
2 contributes the second conditional as-
sertion of the overall precondition. We must also capture that two runs, in order to agree
on OUT 0 DAT after the conditional, must agree on the value of the test B; this is doneSummary information for p:
OUTp = {x}
derives x from y, z when y> 0, w when y≤ 0
Procedure call
{z > 7 ⇒ vn, z > 5 ⇒ un, z > 5 ⇒ yn, z > 5 ∧ y > 0 ⇒ zn, z > 5 ∧ y ≤ 0 ⇒ wn}
call p
{x > 5 ∧ z > 7 ⇒ vn, x > 7 ∧ z > 5 ⇒ (x + u)n}
Fig.8. An example illustrating the handling of procedure calls.
by R0
0 which generates the precondition (true ∧ B) ∨ (true ∧ ¬B) ⇒ Bn; optimiza-
tions (not shown) in our algorithm simplify this to Bn and then use Fact. 3 to split out
the variables in the conjuncts of B into the two unconditional assertions of the overall
precondition. Finally, assume the postcondition contained an assertion φ ⇒ En where
E is not modiﬁed by either branch: if also φ is not modiﬁed then φ ⇒ En belongs to
both R1 and R2, and hence by R0 also to the overall precondition; if φ is modiﬁed by
one or both branches, R0 generates a more complex antecedent for En.
Interprocedural analysis: A procedure summary for p must satisfy:
1. if s P(p) s0 then s(w) = s0(w) for all w / ∈ OUTp;
2. a postcondition is of the form wn with w ∈ OUTp, and for each w ∈ OUTp there
is exactly one postcondition wn;
3. a precondition is of the form φ ⇒ zn;
4. for each postcondition wn there is a precondition of the form true ⇒ zn;
5. foreachpostconditionwn,withΘw itspreconditions:ifs&s1 |= Θw ands P(p) s0
and s1 P(p) s0
1 then s0(w) = s0
1(w).
Here Requirement 1 expresses that OUTp does indeed contain all output variables. Re-
quirements 2 and 3 were motivated in Sect. 4.2. Requirement 4 is needed for Lemma 6
to hold; it might seem restrictive but can always be established without losing preci-
sion, as by adding true ⇒ qn where q is a variable not occurring in the program.
Requirement 5 expresses that the summary computes correct information ﬂow.
At a call site call p, antecedents in the call’s postcondition will carry over to the pre-
condition, provided that they do not involve variables in OUTP. Otherwise, since our
summaries express variable dependencies but not functional relationships, we cannot
state an exact formula for modifying antecedents (unlike what is the case for assign-
ments). Instead, we must conservatively strengthen the preconditions, by weakening
their antecedents; this is done by an operator rm+ such that if φ0 = rm
+
X(φ) (where
X = OUTp) then φ logically implies φ0 where φ0 does not contain any variables from
X. A trivial deﬁnition of rm+ is to let it always return true (which drops all conditions
associated with X), but we can often get something more precise; for instance, we can
choose rm
+
{x}(x > 7 ∧ z > 5) = (z > 5) as is done by the deﬁnition of rm+ given in
Appendix (p.36).
Equipped with rm+, we can now deﬁne the analysis of procedure call, as done in
Fig. 7 and illustrated in Fig. 8. Here Ru deals with assertions (such as x > 5 ∧ z > 7 ⇒
vn in the example) whose consequent has not been modiﬁed by the procedure call
(its “frame conditions” determined by the OUT declaration). For an assertion whose
consequent E has been modiﬁed (such as x > 7 ∧ z > 5 ⇒ (x + u)n), we must ensure
that the variables of E agree after the procedure call (when the antecedent holds). For
those not in OUTp (such as u), this is done by R0 (which expresses some “semi framewhile i < 7 do
if odd(i)
then r := r + v; v := v + h
else v := x;
i := i + 1
{rn}
Iteration 0 1 2 3
false false false false ⇒ hn
false true true true ⇒ in
true true true true ⇒ rn
false odd(i) odd(i) odd(i) ⇒ vn
false false ¬odd(i) true ⇒ xn
Fig.9. Iterative analysis of while loop. (We use odd(i) as a shorthand for imod2 = 1.)
conditions”); for those in OUTp (such as x), this is done by Rm which utilizes the
procedure summary (contract) of the called procedure.
Analyzing iteration: For while loops, the idea is to consider assertions of the form
φx ⇒ xn and then repeatedly analyze the loop body so as to iteratively weaken the
antecedents until a ﬁxed point is reached. To illustrate the overall behavior, consider
the example in Fig. 9 where we are given rn as postcondition; hence the initial value
of r’s antecedent is true whereas all other antecedents are initialized to false. The ﬁrst
iteration updates v’s antecedent to odd(i), since v is used to compute r when i is
odd, and also updates i’s antecedent to true, since (the parity of) i is used to decide
whether r is updated or not. The second iteration updates x’s antecedent to ¬odd(i),
since in order for two runs to agree on v when i is odd, they must have agreed on x
in the previous iteration when i was even. The third iteration updates x’s antecedent
to true, since in order for two runs to agree on x when i is even, then must agree on x
always (as x doesn’t change). We have now reached a ﬁxed point. It is noteworthy that
even though the postcondition mentions rn, and r is updated using v which in turn is
updated using h, the generated precondition does not mention h, since the parity of i
was exploited. This shows [5] that even if we should only aim at producing contracts
where all assertions are unconditional, precision may still be improved if the analysis
engine makes internal use of conditional assertions.
In the general case, however, ﬁxed point iteration may not terminate. To ensure ter-
mination, we need a “widening operator” 5 on 1-assertions, with the following prop-
erties:
(a) for all φ and ψ, ψ logically implies ψ 5 φ, and also φ logically implies ψ 5 φ;
(b) if for all i we have that φi+1 is of the form ψ 5 φi, then the chain {φi | i ≥ 0}
eventually stabilizes.
A trivial widening operator is the one that always returns true, in effect converting
conditional agreement assertions into unconditional. A less trivial option will utilize a
number of assertions, say ψ1 ...ψk, and allow ψ 5 φ = ψj if ψj is logically implied
by ψ as well as by φ; such assertions may be given by the user if he has a hint that a
suitable invariant may have one of ψ1 ...ψk as antecedent.
We can now explain the various lines in the clause for while loops in Fig. 7. The
iteration starts with antecedents φ0
w that are computed such that the corresponding 2-
assertion, Θi, implies the postcondition Θ0. The i’th iteration updates the antecedents
φi
w into antecedents φi+1
w that are potentially weaker in that for each w ∈ X, each
disjunct of ψi
w must imply φi+1
w ; here ψi
w captures the “business logic” of the while
loop:
1. if the precondition computed for the iteration contains an assertion φ ⇒ En with
w ∈ fv(E), then φ is an element of ψi
w.2. if a consequent has been modiﬁed by the loop body, then the antecedent must be-
long to ψi
w for all w ∈ fv(B).
Here (2) ensures that if one run stays in the loop and updates a variable on which the
two runs must agree, then also the other run stays in the loop, cf. the role of R0
0 did in
the clause for conditionals, whereas (1) caters for the soundness when both runs stay in
the loop, cf. the role of R0
1 and R0
2 in the case for conditionals. Alternatively, to more
closely follow the rule for conditionals, for (1) we could instead demand that φ ∧ B
belongs to ψi
w; our current choice reﬂects that we expect the bodies of while loops to
be preﬁxed by assert statements (which will automatically add B to the antecedents),
but do not expect such transformations for branches of a conditional.
With the iteration stabilizing after j steps (thanks to the widening operator), the
while loop’s precondition Θ and its R component can now be computed; the former is
given as the domain of the latter which is made up from two parts.
– First, Ru deals with those assertions in Θ0 whose consequents have not been mod-
iﬁed (a kind of “frame condition” for the while loop); each such assertion is con-
nected to an assertion with the same consequent (so as to establish Lemma 5) but
with an antecedent that is designed to be so weak that we can establish Lemma 6.
– Next, Rm deals with those assertions in Θ0 whose consequents have been modi-
ﬁed; each such assertion is connected to all other assertions in Θj so as to express
that the subsequent iterations of the while loop may give rise to chains of variable
dependences. (It would be possible to give a deﬁnition that in most cases produces
only a subset of those connections, but this would increase the conceptual com-
plexity of Pre, without – we conjecture – any improvement in the overall precision
of the algorithm.) In addition, again to establish Lemma 6, we introduce a trivial
assertion true ⇒ 0n.
6 Evaluation
6.1 Summary of performance
The algorithm of Section 5 provides a foundation for both checking (conditional and un-
conditional) derivescontractssuppliedbyadeveloper,andforautomaticallyinferring
contracts from implementations (for checking contracts supplied by a developer, the al-
gorithm infers a pre-condition Θ from the supplied postcondition and then checks that
the supplied precondition entails Θ). There is much merit in a methodology that encour-
ages writing of the contract before writing/checking the implementation. However, one
of our strategies for injecting our techniques into industrial development groups is to
pitch the tools as being able to discover more precise conditional speciﬁcations to sup-
plement conventional SPARK derives contracts already in the code; thus we focus the
experimental studies of this section on the more challenging problem of automatically
inferring contracts. For each procedure, the input to the algorithm is a post-condition
w1
on1,...,wk
onk for each wj
o ∈ OUT. Since SPARK disallows recursion, we simply
move in a bottom-up fashion through the call-graph – guaranteeing that a contract exists
for each called procedure. When deployed in actual development, one would probably
allow developers to tweak the generated contracts (e.g., by removing unnecessary con-
ditions for establishing end-to-end policies) before proceeding with contract inference
for methods in the next level of the call hierarchy. However, in our experiments, weFlows Cond. Flows Gens. Time (seconds) Package.Procedure Name LoC C L P O SF 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Autopilot.AP.Altitude.Pitch.Rate.History Average 10 0 1 0 1 2 5 3 0 0 0 0 0.047 0.063
Autopilot.AP.Altitude.Pitch.Rate.History Update 8 1 1 0 1 2 3 3 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.157
Autopilot.AP.Altitude.Pitch.Rate.Calc Pitchrate 13 2 0 2 2 7 17 8 0 0 15 15 0.000 0.015
Autopilot.AP.Altitude.Pitch.Target ROC 9 2 0 0 1 2 7 3 6 2 0 0 0.000 0.000
Autopilot.AP.Altitude.Pitch.Target Rate 17 4 0 1 1 3 53 4 42 0 142 46 0.015 0.015
Autopilot.AP.Altitude.Pitch.Calc Elevator Move 7 0 0 1 1 3 4 4 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.000
Autopilot.AP.Altitude.Pitch.Pitch AP 7 0 0 4 2 11 54 11 42 0 0 0 0.015 0.000
Autopilot.AP.Altitude.Maintain 9 2 0 1 4 19 36 23 23 19 0 0 0.000 0.015
Autopilot.AP.Heading.Roll.Target ROR 15 3 0 1 1 2 4 3 0 0 26 26 0.000 0.000
Autopilot.AP.Heading.Roll.Target Rate 11 2 0 1 1 3 9 4 0 0 14 14 0.000 0.000
Autopilot.AP.Heading.Roll.Calc Aileron Move 7 0 0 1 1 3 4 4 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.000
Autopilot.AP.Heading.Roll.Roll AP 7 0 0 4 2 7 9 7 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.000
Autopilot.AP.Control 19 1 0 13 8 46 58 54 0 0 63 51 0.016 0.032
Autopilot.AP.Heading.Yaw.Calc Rudder Move 7 0 0 1 1 2 4 3 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.000
Autopilot.AP.Heading.Yaw.Yaw AP 5 0 0 3 2 5 5 5 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.000
Autopilot.Scale.Inverse 4 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.016
Autopilot.Scale.Scale Movement 22 4 0 2 1 4 47 10 46 9 0 0 0.016 0.000
Autopilot.Scale.Heading Offset 7 1 0 0 1 1 3 1 2 0 0 0 0.000 0.000
Autopilot.Heading.Maintain 6 1 0 2 4 15 28 20 16 16 0 0 0.000 0.000
Autopilot.Main 5 0 1 1 8 47 176 54 0 0 0 0 0.031 0.031
Minepump.Logbuffer.ProtectedWrite 8 1 0 0 5 9 9 9 4 4 0 0 0.031 0.047
Minepump.Logbuffer.ProtectedRead 6 0 0 0 5 6 7 7 0 0 0 0 0.000 0.000
Minepump.Logbuffer.Write 2 0 0 1 5 9 11 9 3 1 0 0 0.000 0.000
Mailbox.MACHINE STEP 17 2 0 0 6 16 18 18 12 12 0 0 0.047 0.062
Mailbox.Main 6 0 1 1 6 16 54 22 0 0 2 2 0.031 0.016
BoilerWater-Monitor.FaultIntegrator.Test 11 3 0 0 4 11 46 22 42 18 0 0 0.047 0.047
BoilerWater-Monitor.FaultIntegrator.ControlHigh 8 1 0 2 2 4 6 5 0 0 2 2 0.000 0.000
BoilerWater-Monitor.FaultIntegrator.ControlLow 8 1 0 2 2 4 6 5 0 0 2 2 0.000 0.000
BoilerWater-Monitor.FaultIntegrator.Main 11 0 1 6 2 2 14 4 0 0 0 0 0.016 0.016
Lift-Controller.Next Floor 9 2 0 0 1 2 7 4 6 3 0 0 0.047 0.047
Lift-Controller.Poll 22 2 1 3 2 9 77 12 43 0 0 0 0.031 0.031
Lift-Controller.Traverse 18 0 1 11 3 10 210 13 66 0 0 0 0.281 0.063
Missile Guidance.Clock Read 12 2 0 0 3 5 13 11 10 8 0 0 0.047 0.047
Missile Guidance.Clock Utils Delta Time 7 1 0 0 1 2 4 2 2 0 0 0 0.000 0.000
Missile Guidance.Extrapolate Speed 13 2 0 2 2 7 14 10 6 4 36 16 0.000 0.000
Missile Guidance.Code To State 12 3 0 0 1 7 15 9 14 8 0 0 0.000 0.000
Missile Guidance.Transition 20 4 0 2 1 9 3527 63 3524 62 4 4 0.156 0.125
Missile Guidance..Relative Drag At Altitude 8 2 0 0 1 1 7 3 6 2 0 0 0.000 0.000
Missile Guidance.Drag cfg.Calc Drag 21 4 0 1 1 3 37 3 34 0 0 0 0.000 0.000
Missile Guidance.If Airspeed Get Speed 6 1 0 0 2 3 4 4 2 2 0 0 0.000 0.000
Missile Guidance.Nav.Handle Airspeed 18 4 0 4 3 13 117 28 110 25 18 18 0.000 0.000
Missile Guidance.Nav.Estimate Height 21 5 0 2 2 11 60 18 57 16 4 4 0.000 0.000
Table 1. Experiment Data (excerpts)
used autogenerated contracts for called methods without modiﬁcation. All experiments
were run under JDK 1.6 on a 2.2 GHz Intel Core2 Duo.
Code bases: Embedded security devices are the initial target domain for our work, and
the security-critical sections to be certiﬁed from these code bases are often relatively
small, e.g., roughly 1000 LOC for the Rockwell Collins high assurance guard men-
tioned earlier and 3000 LOC for the (undisclosed) device recently certiﬁed by Naval
Research Labs researchers [18]. For our evaluation, we consider a collection of six
small to moderate size applications from the SPARK distribution in addition to an ex-
panded version of the mailbox example of Section 2. Of these, the Autopilot and Missile
Control applications are the most realistic. There are well over 250 procedures in the
code bases, but due to space constraints, in Table 1 we list metrics for only the most
complex procedures from each application (see [32] for the source code of all the ex-
amples). Columns LOC, C, L, and P report the number of non-comment lines of code,
conditional expressions, loops, and procedure calls in each method. Our tool can run
in two modes. The ﬁrst mode (identiﬁed as version 1 in Table 1) implements the rules
of Figure 7 directly, with just one small optimization: a collection of boolean simpli-
ﬁcations are introduced, e.g., simplifying assertions of the form true ∧ φ ⇒ En toφ ⇒ En. The second mode (version 2 in Table 1) enables a collection of simpliﬁ-
cations aimed at compacting and eliminating redundant ﬂows from the generated set
of assertions. The ﬁrst simpliﬁcation performed is elimination of assertions with false
in the antecedent (these are trivially true), and elimination of duplicate assertions. Fi-
nally, it adds elimination of simple entailed assertions, e.g., it eliminates φ⇒En when
true⇒En also appears in the assertion set.
Typical reﬁnement power of the algorithm: Column O gives the number of OUT
variables of a procedure (this is equal to the number of derives clauses in the original
SPARK contract), and Column SF gives the number of ﬂows (total number of IN/OUT
pairs) appearing in the original contract. Column Flows gives the number of ﬂows gen-
erated by different versions of our algorithm. This number increases over SF as SPARK
ﬂows are reﬁned into conditional ﬂows (often creating two or more conditioned ﬂows
for a particular IN/OUT variable pair). The data shows that the compacting optimiza-
tions often substantially reduce the number of ﬂows; the practical impact of this is to
substantially increase the readability/tractability of the contracts. Column Cond. Flows
indicates the number of ﬂows from Flows that are conditional. We expect to see the re-
ﬁning power of our approach in procedures with conditionals (column C) primarily, but
we also see increases in precision that is due to conditional contracts of called proce-
dures (column P). In a few cases we see a blow-up in the number of conditional ﬂows.
The worse case is MissileGuidance.Transition, which contains a case statement
with each branch containing nested conditionals and procedure calls with conditional
contracts – leading to an exponential explosion in path conditions. Only a few vari-
ables in these conditions lie in what we consider to be the “control logic” of the system.
The tractability of this example would improve signiﬁcantly with the methodology sug-
gested earlier in which developers declare explicitly the guarding variables (such as the
xx RDY variables of Fig. 1) and the algorithm then omits tracking of conditional ﬂows
not associated with declared guard variables. Overall, a manual inspection of each in-
ferred contract showed that the algorithm usually produces conditions that an expert
would expect. Importantly, we have veriﬁed by manual inspection that the algorithm
never produces a contract that is less precise than the original SPARK contract (it is
always a formal reﬁnement of the original).
Efﬁciency of inference algorithm: As can be see in the Time columns, the algorithm
is quite fast for all the examples, usually taking a little longer in version 2 (all optimiza-
tions on). However, for some examples, version 2 is actually faster; these are the cases
of procedures with calls to other procedures. Due to the optimizations, the callees now
have simpler contracts, simplifying the processing of the caller procedures.
Sourcesoflossofprecision:Wewouldliketodeterminesituationswhereourtreatment
of loops or procedure calls leads to abstraction steps that discard conditional informa-
tion. While this is difﬁcult to determine for loops (one would have to compare to the
most precise loop invariant – which would need to be written by hand), Column Gens.
indicates the number of conditions dropped across processing of procedure calls. The
data shows, and our experience conﬁrms, that the loss of precision is not drastic (in
some cases, one wants conditions to be discarded), but more experience is needed to
determine the practical impact on veriﬁcation of end-to-end properties.
Threats to validity of experiments: While the applications we consider are representa-
tive of small embedded controller systems, only the mailbox example is an information
assurance application. While these initial results are encouraging, we are still in theprocess of negotiating access to the source code of actual products being developed
at Rockwell Collins; that will allow us to answer the important question: does our ap-
proachprovidetheprecisionneededtobetterverifylocalandend-to-endMILSpolicies,
without generating large contracts that become unwieldy for developers and certiﬁers?
6.2 Detailed discussion of selected examples
In this section we give a detailed discussion of two case studies: the Mailbox example
(brieﬂy discussed in Sec. 2), and part of the control code for the Autopilot code base (for
which number ﬁgures were given in Tab. 1). For the Mailbox, we will simply discuss
in detail the MACHINE STEP procedure, previously introduced, comparing the results
of running our tool with the original SPARK speciﬁcation. On the other hand, in the
Autopilot case study we will discuss 4 procedures and 2 functions, spanning a whole
call chain in the package, starting at the Main procedure, and going through the code
that controls the altitude in this simpliﬁed example of an aircraft autopilot.
Mailbox Example This example was discussed in detail in Sec. 2, so here we will
focus in comparing the resulting information ﬂow speciﬁcations obtained from running
our tool on the code with the original SPARK speciﬁcation. Figure 10 shows the pro-
cedure MACHINE STEP with the original SPARK information ﬂow speciﬁcation. On the
other hand, Fig. 11 shows the information ﬂow speciﬁcation obtained by running out
tool on the same procedure (using the slightly modiﬁed version of the SPARK language
described in Sec. 4.2). For simpplicity, in Fig. 11 we have ommitted the body of the pro-
cedure, as well as the global annotations. In addition to using unabbreviated variable
names, the code of Figure 10 differs from that of Figure 1 in its use of procedures to
manipulate both the control variables (e.g., Mailbox.CHARACTER INPUT 0 READY) as
wellasthedatavariablesofthesystem.Forexample,theprocedure NOTIFY INPUT 0 CONSUMED
clearsthe Mailbox.CHARACTER INPUT 0 READYﬂagwhereas NOTIFY OUTPUT 1 READY
sets the Mailbox.CHARACTER OUTPUT 1 READY ﬂag.
Upon close examination of Fig. 11 we can see the usage of the symbol {}. These
empty braces are used to represent ﬂow from a constant value. For example, in the
following information ﬂow declaration from Fig. 11:
derives . . . Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 0 READY from
. . . {} when ( Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 0 READY
and not Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 1 READY)
indicatesthatthevariable Mailbox.CHARACTER INPUT 0 READY,inthecasewhenthe
condition speciﬁed holds, has its post-condition value derived from a constant instead
of another variable. By examining the code in Fig. 10 we can see that this is the case
when Mailbox.CHARACTER INPUT 0 READY is assigned the literal false.
The results displayed in Fig. 11 show that the information ﬂow speciﬁcations for
every variable in this example have been reﬁned with at least one conditional ﬂow.
Now, what we really are interested in is determine what are the beneﬁts gained from
having such a reﬁned information ﬂow speciﬁcation. That is, what do we gain from
having information ﬂow speciﬁcations split into cases denoted by particular conditions?
We must keep in mind what the objective of research and engineering effort is: we
want to build a foundation for an information assurance speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation
framework.
From our point of view, an adequate information ﬂow assurance framework must
capture and describe the following information about an information-critical system:procedure MACHINE STEP
− −# global in out Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 0 READY ,
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 1 READY ,
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 0 READY,
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 1 READY,
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 0 DATA,
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 1 DATA;
− −# in Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 0 DATA ,
− −# Mailbox . CHARACTER INPUT 1 DATA;
− −# derives Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 0 DATA from Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 1 DATA ,
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 0 READY,
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 0 DATA,
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 1 READY &
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 1 DATA from Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 0 DATA ,
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 0 READY ,
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 1 DATA,
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 1 READY &
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 0 READY from Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 0 READY ,
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 1 READY &
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 1 READY from Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 1 READY ,
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 0 READY &
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 0 READY from Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 0 READY,
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 1 READY &
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 1 READY from Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 1 READY,
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 0 READY;
is
DATA 0 : CHARACTER;
DATA 1 : CHARACTER;
begin
if Mailbox .INPUT 0 READY and Mailbox .OUTPUT 1 CONSUMED then
DATA 0 := Mailbox .READ INPUT 0;
Mailbox .NOTIFY INPUT 0 CONSUMED;
Mailbox .WRITE OUTPUT 1(DATA 0);
Mailbox .NOTIFY OUTPUT 1 READY;
end if ;
if Mailbox .INPUT 1 READY and Mailbox .OUTPUT 0 CONSUMED then
DATA 1 := Mailbox .READ INPUT 1;
Mailbox .NOTIFY INPUT 1 CONSUMED;
Mailbox .WRITE OUTPUT 0(DATA 1);
Mailbox .NOTIFY OUTPUT 0 READY;
end if ;
end MACHINE STEP;
Fig.10. Original SPARK speciﬁcation for Mailbox example.
procedure MACHINE STEP;
− −# derives Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 0 DATA
− −# from Mailbox . CHARACTER INPUT 1 DATA
− −# when ( Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 1 READY and not Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 0 READY) ,
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 0 READY,
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 0 DATA
− −# when ( not ( Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 1 READY and not Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 0 READY)) ,
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 1 READY &
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 1 DATA
− −# from Mailbox . CHARACTER INPUT 0 DATA
− −# when ( Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 0 READY and not Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 1 READY) ,
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 0 READY ,
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 1 DATA
− −# when ( not ( Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 0 READY and not Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 1 READY)) ,
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 1 READY &
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 0 READY
− −# from Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 0 READY ,
− −# {} when ( Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 0 READY and not Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 1 READY) ,
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 1 READY &
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 1 READY
− −# from Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 1 READY ,
− −# {} when ( Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 1 READY and not Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 0 READY) ,
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 0 READY &
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 0 READY
− −# from Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 0 READY,
− −# {} when ( Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 0 READY and not Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 1 READY) ,
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 1 READY &
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 1 READY
− −# from Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 1 READY,
− −# {} when ( Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 1 READY and not Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 0 READY) ,
− −# Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 0 READY;
Fig.11. Results of running tool on Mailbox example.
– Admissible Channels of Information Flow: the framework must provide mech-
anisms to appropriately specify when a ﬂow of information from one part of the
system to another (or from one variable to another) is acceptable. The original
derives annotations from SPARK, and its corresponding checking mechanism,can already be used for this purpose (although they were not originally intended to
fulﬁll this functionality).
– Enabling Conditions for Information Flow Channels: the framework must pro-
vide mechanisms to specify under what conditions a particular information ﬂow
channel is active. In information ﬂow assurance applications, information ﬂow
channels are often controlled by system conditions. However, as it is, SPARK does
not posses any mechanism that allows specifying under what conditions a particular
information ﬂow channel is active.
In the case of the mailbox example, we have a device intended to serve as a com-
munication channel between two entities. If we were to try to describe the information
ﬂow policy requirements for the mailbox, we could write something like:
The mailbox will guarantee that information produced at the by Client 0 will be
forwarded to Client 1, and the information produced by Client 1 will be forwarded to
Client 0.
However, when we look at the information ﬂow speciﬁcation for the Client 0’s out-
put on Fig. 10, we have:
derives Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 0 DATA from Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 1 DATA,
Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 0 READY,
Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 0 DATA,
Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 1 READY
The output of Client 0 is not derived only from Client 1’s input, but from other
3 variables. It is not necessarily obvious where these other dependences are coming
from, and they certainly do not match with our ﬁrst attempt at describing the mailbox’s
behavior. As it turns out, what happens here is that this speciﬁcation describes more
than one information ﬂow channel, and the conditions on which they are active, but all
this information has been merged into a single annotation. Let ut look at the equivalent
annotation from Fig. 11 to see what is going on:
derives Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 0 DATA
from Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 1 DATA
when ( Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 1 READY
and not Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 0 READY) ,
Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 0 READY,
Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 0 DATA
when ( not ( Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 1 READY
and not Mailbox .CHARACTER OUTPUT 0 READY)) ,
Mailbox .CHARACTER INPUT 1 READY
In the original SPARK speciﬁcation, we cannot tell whether there are several infor-
mation channels, or that the target variable is derived from a combination of the source
varibales, because there are no conditions. However, by looking at the speciﬁcation
produced by our tool, we can see that there are actually 2 information ﬂow channels
acting on this variable, controlled by two different conditions. We can also see that
the dependence on the extra 2 variables is produced from control dependence on the
variables that are used to compute the conditions.
It is clear now that there are 2 information ﬂow channels working on this variable:
(1) when information is available from Client 1 and Client 0 is ready to receive this
information, then the output read by Client 0 is derived from the input produced by
Client 1, and (2) if either there is not input from Client 1 or Client 0 is not ready to
receive, then the output read by Client 0 keeps its old value. And clearly, which of
these two channels is active depends on the aforementioned conditions, which in turn
produced a control dependence on the variables that keep track of whether Client 1 has
produced any information, and whether Client 0 is ready to receive.After the previous discussion, the beneﬁts of having conditional information ﬂow
speciﬁcations are immediately clear. We have a more precise description of the be-
havior of the system, and are able to check both aspects of the information assurance
behavior of a system that we described before: the channels of information ﬂow and the
conditions under which those channels are active.
Another improvement that could be done is differentiate the parts of the speciﬁca-
tion that deal with the control logic from those that deal exclusively with information
ﬂow. For example, in the case of the mailbox annotation for output 0, we get depen-
dences on a couple of extra variables tha arise from control dependence. Perhaps one
could mark these ﬂows with a special annotation to explicitly state that they arise from
the control logic. Similarly, we can see in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 that, besides those for the
output variables, we have ﬂow annotations for each of the control variables. These an-
notations are needed because these variables may be reset by the procedure. However,
these modiﬁcations of control variables is also part of the control logic, and maybe these
ﬂows could also be annotates in a special way. Furthermore, one could imagine a tool
that would use these annotations to ﬁlter views and show all annotations, or hide ﬂows
corresponding to the control logic, etc.
Autopilot Example The Autopilot system is one of the examples included in the
SPARK distribution (discussed in detail in [7, Chapter 14]). This is a control system
controlling both the altitude and heading of an aircraft. The altitude is controlled by ma-
nipulating the elevators and the the heading is controlled by manipulating the ailerons
and rudder. The autopilot has a control panel with three switches each of which has two
positions – on and off.
– The master switch – the autopilot is completely inactive if this is off.
– The altitude switch – the autopilot controls the altitude if this is on.
– The heading switch – the autopilot controls the heading if this is on.
Desired autopilot heading values are entered in a console by the pilot, whereas desired
altitude values are determined by the current altitude (similar to how an automobile
cruise control takes it target speed from the current speed when the cruise control is ac-
tivated). For this example we will take a look at a total of 4 procedures and 2 functions.
The procedure in Figure 16 is interesting for conditional information ﬂow analysis
for multiple reasons:
– it contains nested case statements with a call at the lowest level of nesting to pro-
cedure Pitch.Pitch AP that updates global variables,
– the actual updates to global variables occur several levels down the call chain from
Pitch.Pitch AP, and
– the call chain includes several procedures with conditional ﬂows – some of the
conditions propagate up through the call chain whereas others do not.
We discuss in detail the conditional information ﬂow along the following call path.
– Main(main.adb)–containsaninﬁniteloopthatdoesnothingbutcall AP.Control
on each iteration
– AP.Control (ap.adb) – reads values for the three switches above from the envi-
ronment.If Master Switchison,thenitusesthevaluesreadfor Altitude Switch
and Heading Switchandtosetswitchvariables Altitude Selectedand Heading Selected,otherwise Altitude Selected and Heading Selected are set to “off”. Instru-
mentsneededtocalculatedaltitudeandheadingareread,then Altitude.Maintain
(with Altitude Selected as the actual parameter for Switch Pressed) and
Heading.Maintain are called to update the autopilot state.
– AP.Altitude.Maintain (ap-altitude.adb) – If Altitude Switch has
transitionedfromofftoon,the Present Altitudeisusedasvaluefor Target Altitude.
Otherwise,thepreviousvalueof Target Altitudeisusedforvalueof Target Altitude.
Pitch.Pitch AP is called to calculate the value of Surfaces.Elevators based
on the parameter values of Pitch.Pitch AP and the pitch history.
– Pitch.Pitch AP (ap-altitude-pitch.ads) – calls a series of helper func-
tionswhichupdatethelocalvariables Present Pitchrate, Target Pitchrate,
and Elevator Movement and these are used in Surfaces.Move Elevators to
calculate the value of the global output variable Surfaces.Elevators The be-
havior of Surfaces.Move Elevators lies outside the SPARK boundary and thus
the interface to Surfaces.Move Elevators represents the leaf of the call tree
path under consideration.
– We will also take a look at a couple of functions called from Pitch.Pitch AP:
Altitude.Target Rateand Altitude.Target ROC.Wedothistodiscusssome
interesting aspects of computing information ﬂow speciﬁcations for SPARK func-
tions.
The ﬁrst procedure we look at is the main procedure. This is, like in most lan-
guages, the top most procedure and the point of access for the whole system. Figure 12
shows the original SPARK speciﬁcations and the code, and Fig. 13 shows the corre-
sponing information ﬂow speciﬁcations computed by our tool. The ﬁrst thing we notice
is that there are more derived variables in the annotations derived by our tool than in
the original annotations. This is not a mistake. The reason for this is that we still have
not incorporated SPARK’s abstraction mechanism in out tool. All the variables in the
derives annotations from Fig. 13 that start with AP. are abstracted into the variable
AP.State in Fig. 12. As a consequence, we get more ﬂow speciﬁcations because they
are reﬁned from those in the original annotations.
An interesting effect of not having abstraction in our annotations is that some of
the false ﬂows introduced by the abstraction process are not present in our annotations.
For instance, in Fig. 12 one of the annotations suggests that Surfaces.Ailerons
may be derived from Instruments.Altitude. However, as we can see in Fig. 13
this is not the case, such ﬂow is absent from the speciﬁcation. The reason this false
ﬂow appears in the abstracted version is that, when all the AP. variables are abstracted
into AP.State, then now Surfaces.Ailerons depends on this new abstract variable
(because it depends on some AP. variables), and since some AP. variables depend on
Instruments.Altitude, then Surfaces.Ailerons gets a possible dependence on
Instruments.Altitude, eventhough this dependence is really non-existent.
Other than the differences described above, the speciﬁcations obtained by our tool
are basically the same as those in the original annotations. Also, we see {} annota-
tions(derivations from constant values). In the original SPARK, these constant deriva-
tions are simply ignored, however we leave them explicit for the sake of completeness.
In fact, these annotations become more interesting when they are associated by them-
selves with a condition, as they might actually represent “reset” conditions (as in the
case of the mailbox example).procedure Main
− −# global in out AP. State ;
− −# out Surfaces . Elevators ,
− −# Surfaces . Ailerons ,
− −# Surfaces . Rudder ;
− −# in Instruments . Altitude ,
− −# Instruments . Bank ,
− −# Instruments . Heading ,
− −# Instruments . Heading Bug ,
− −# Instruments .Mach ,
− −# Instruments . Pitch ,
− −# Instruments . Rate Of Climb ,
− −# Instruments . Slip ;
− −# derives AP. State
− −# from ∗,
− −# Instruments . Altitude ,
− −# Instruments . Bank ,
− −# Instruments . Pitch ,
− −# Instruments . Slip &
− −# Surfaces . Elevators
− −# from
− −# AP. State ,
− −# Instruments . Altitude ,
− −# Instruments . Bank ,
− −# Instruments .Mach ,
− −# Instruments . Pitch ,
− −# Instruments . Rate Of Climb ,
− −# Instruments . Slip
− −# &
− −# Surfaces . Ailerons
− −# from
− −# AP. State ,
− −# Instruments . Altitude ,
− −# Instruments . Bank ,
− −# Instruments . Heading ,
− −# Instruments . Heading Bug ,
− −# Instruments .Mach ,
− −# Instruments . Pitch ,
− −# Instruments . Slip &
− −# Surfaces . Rudder
− −# from AP. State ,
− −# Instruments . Altitude ,
− −# Instruments . Bank ,
− −# Instruments .Mach ,
− −# Instruments . Pitch ,
− −# Instruments . Slip
− −# ;
is
begin
loop
AP. Control ;
end loop ;
end Main ;
Fig.12. Original SPARK speciﬁcation for procedure main from the autopilot code base.
Next we look at the procedure AP.Control. The original SPARK annotations, as
well as the code for the procedure are given in Fig. 14, and the result from our tool is
presented in Fig. 15. Just as with main procedure explained before, we get basically the
same annotations, except for getting extra variables due to differences in abstraction,
and the presence of {} annotations in our tool’s results. However, it is rather disappoint-
ing that we don’t get conditional information ﬂow speciﬁcations in this example. On
close look at the code, we see there is case statement in the body that should give rise
to conditions. Furthermore, as we will see later, most of the procedures called from this
procedure generate conditional speciﬁcations. So, why don’t we get any conditional
speciﬁcations here?
The bottom line is that we are getting hurt by the generalization rules triggered
by the procedure call rule discussed in Sec. 5. The procedure does generte conditions,
however, all this conditions are dropped once the top 3 procedure calls are analyzed:
the procedures that read the value of the switches (the guard variables). What happens
is that the conditions generated are basically predicates in terms of the guard variables
(the value of the switches) and since the top 3 procedures set these switch vaiables, we
have to drop the conditions, and turn the annotation into an un-conditional one.procedure Main ;
− −# derives AP. Heading .Yaw. Rate . Yaw History
− −# from ∗,
− −# {},
− −# AP. Controls . Master Switch ,
− −# AP. Controls . Heading Switch ,
− −# Instruments . Slip &
− −# AP. Altitude . Pitch . Rate . Pitch History
− −# from ∗,
− −# {},
− −# AP. Controls . Master Switch ,
− −# AP. Controls . Altitude Switch ,
− −# Instruments . Pitch &
− −# AP. Heading . Roll . Rate . Roll History
− −# from ∗,
− −# {},
− −# AP. Controls . Master Switch ,
− −# AP. Controls . Heading Switch ,
− −# Instruments . Bank &
− −# AP. Altitude . Target Altitude
− −# from ∗,
− −# {},
− −# AP. Controls . Master Switch ,
− −# AP. Controls . Altitude Switch ,
− −# AP. Altitude . Switch Pressed Before ,
− −# Instruments . Altitude &
− −# AP. Altitude . Switch Pressed Before
− −# from ∗,
− −# {},
− −# AP. Controls . Master Switch ,
− −# AP. Controls . Altitude Switch &
− −# Surfaces . Elevators
− −# from {},
− −# AP. Controls . Master Switch ,
− −# AP. Controls . Altitude Switch
− −# AP. Altitude . Pitch . Rate . Pitch History ,
− −# AP. Altitude . Switch Pressed Before ,
− −# AP. Altitude . Target Altitude ,
− −# Instruments . Altitude ,
− −# Instruments .Mach ,
− −# Instruments . Pitch ,
− −# Instruments . Rate Of Climb &
− −# Surfaces . Ailerons
− −# from {},
− −# AP. Controls . Master Switch ,
− −# AP. Controls . Heading Switch ,
− −# AP. Heading . Roll . Rate . Roll History ,
− −# Instruments . Bank ,
− −# Instruments . Heading ,
− −# Instruments . Heading Bug ,
− −# Instruments . Mach &
− −# Surfaces . Rudder
− −# from {},
− −# AP. Controls . Master Switch ,
− −# AP. Controls . Heading Switch ,
− −# AP. Heading .Yaw. Rate . Yaw History ,
− −# Instruments .Mach ,
− −# Instruments . Slip
− −# ;
Fig.13. Results of running tool on procedure main from the autopilot code base.
To see this with more detail, let us take a look at what happens at the return point
of the procedure call to Controls.Read Heading Switch. Recall that our algorithm
is a weakest pre-condition algorithm, and as such, it works bottom-up. So, when we
reach the point right before the call to this procedure, the algorithm has, among all of
the derivations generated, the following ﬂow speciﬁcation:
derives Surfaces . Ailerons from Instruments . Heading
when Heading Switch = Controls .On and Master Switch = Controls .On
This speciﬁcation basically tells us that if the heading and master switches are in
the ON position, then Surfaces.Ailerons derives its value from the current head-
ing reading (Instruments.Heading). Furthermore, another similar speciﬁcation tells
us that is the heading switch is OFF, then Surfaces.Ailerons maintains its cur-
rent value. However, when we process the call to Controls.Read Heading Switch,
all this information is lost, because this procedure sets the value of Heading Switch
with the actual state of the switch. In doing this, since our analysis is modular (i.e.,
we do not look at the body of Controls.Read Heading Switch), we do not knowprocedure Control
− −# global in Controls . Master Switch ,
− −# Controls . Altitude Switch ,
− −# Controls . Heading Switch ;
− −# in out Altitude . State ,
− −# Heading . State ;
− −# out Surfaces . Elevators ,
− −# Surfaces . Ailerons ,
− −# Surfaces . Rudder ;
− −# in Instruments . Altitude ,
− −# Instruments . Bank ,
− −# Instruments . Heading ,
− −# Instruments . Heading Bug ,
− −# Instruments .Mach ,
− −# Instruments . Pitch ,
− −# Instruments . Rate Of Climb ,
− −# Instruments . Slip ;
− −# derives Altitude . State
− −# from ∗,
− −# Controls . Master Switch ,
− −# Controls . Altitude Switch ,
− −# Instruments . Altitude ,
− −# Instruments . Pitch &
− −# Heading . State
− −# from ∗,
− −# Controls . Master Switch ,
− −# Controls . Heading Switch ,
− −# Instruments . Bank ,
− −# Instruments . Slip &
− −# Surfaces . Elevators
− −# from Controls . Master Switch ,
− −# Controls . Altitude Switch ,
− −# Altitude . State ,
− −# Instruments . Altitude ,
− −# Instruments .Mach ,
− −# Instruments . Pitch ,
− −# Instruments . Rate Of Climb &
− −# Surfaces . Ailerons
− −# from Controls . Master Switch ,
− −# Controls . Heading Switch ,
− −# Heading . State ,
− −# Instruments . Bank ,
− −# Instruments . Heading ,
− −# Instruments . Heading Bug ,
− −# Instruments . Mach &
− −# Surfaces . Rudder
− −# from Controls . Master Switch ,
− −# Controls . Heading Switch ,
− −# Heading . State ,
− −# Instruments .Mach ,
− −# Instruments . Slip
− −# ;
is
Master Switch , Altitude Switch , Heading Switch ,
Altitude Selected , Heading Selected : Controls . Switch ;
Present Altitude : Instruments . Feet ;
Bank : Instruments . Bankangle ;
Present Heading : Instruments . Headdegree ;
Target Heading : Instruments . Headdegree ;
Mach : Instruments . Machnumber ;
Pitch : Instruments . Pitchangle ;
Rate Of Climb : Instruments . Feetpermin ;
Slip : Instruments . Slipangle ;
begin
Controls . Read Master Switch ( Master Switch );
Controls . Read Altitude Switch ( Altitude Switch );
Controls . Read Heading Switch ( Heading Switch );
case Master Switch is
when Controls .On = >
Altitude Selected := Altitude Switch ;
Heading Selected := Heading Switch ;
when Controls . Off = >
Altitude Selected := Controls . Off ;
Heading Selected := Controls . Off ;
end case ;
Instruments . Read Altimeter ( Present Altitude );
Instruments . Read Bank Indicator (Bank );
Instruments . Read Compass ( Present Heading );
Instruments . Read Heading Bug ( Target Heading );
Instruments . Read Mach Indicator (Mach );
Instruments . Read Pitch Indicator ( Pitch );
Instruments . Read VSI ( Rate Of Climb );
Instruments . Read Slip Indicator ( Slip );
Altitude . Maintain ( Altitude Selected , Present Altitude ,Mach , Rate Of Climb , Pitch );
Heading . Maintain ( Heading Selected ,Mach , Present Heading , Target Heading , Bank , Slip );
end Control ;
Fig.14. Original speciﬁcation for procedure AP.Control from the autopilot code base.
in general what this modiﬁcation to Heading Switch did, and so we have to drop
the condition. At the very least we would have to drop the part of the condition thatprocedure Control ;
− −# derives Altitude . Switch Pressed Before
− −# from ∗,
− −# {},
− −# Controls . Master Switch ,
− −# Controls . Altitude Switch &
− −# Altitude . Pitch . Rate . Pitch History
− −# from ∗,
− −# {},
− −# Controls . Master Switch ,
− −# Controls . Altitude Switch ,
− −# Instruments . Pitch &
− −# Altitude . Target Altitude
− −# from ∗,
− −# {},
− −# Controls . Master Switch ,
− −# Controls . Altitude Switch ,
− −# Altitude . Switch Pressed Before ,
− −# Instruments . Altitude &
− −# Heading .Yaw. Rate . Yaw History
− −# from ∗,
− −# {},
− −# Controls . Master Switch ,
− −# Controls . Heading Switch ,
− −# Instruments . Slip &
− −# Heading . Roll . Rate . Roll History
− −# from ∗,
− −# {},
− −# Controls . Master Switch ,
− −# Controls . Heading Switch ,
− −# Instruments . Bank &
− −# Surfaces . Elevators
− −# from {},
− −# Controls . Master Switch ,
− −# Controls . Altitude Switch ,
− −# Altitude . Target Altitude ,
− −# Altitude . Switch Pressed Before ,
− −# Altitude . Pitch . Rate . Pitch History ,
− −# Instruments . Altitude ,
− −# Instruments .Mach ,
− −# Instruments . Pitch ,
− −# Instruments . Rate Of Climb &
− −# Surfaces . Ailerons
− −# from {},
− −# Controls . Master Switch ,
− −# Controls . Heading Switch ,
− −# Heading . Roll . Rate . Roll History ,
− −# Instruments . Bank ,
− −# Instruments . Heading ,
− −# Instruments . Heading Bug ,
− −# Instruments . Mach &
− −# Surfaces . Rudder
− −# from {},
− −# Controls . Master Switch ,
− −# Controls . Heading Switch ,
− −# Heading .Yaw. Rate . Yaw History ,
− −# Instruments .Mach ,
− −# Instruments . Slip
− −# ;
Fig.15. Results of running tool on procedure AP.Control from the autopilot code base.
refers to Heading Switch, however in this case it does not matter, because as soon
as Controls.Read Master Switch was analyzed, the rest of the condition would be
dropped.
As it turns out, in this particular case, it would be safe not to drop the condition and
simply substitue Heading Switch with Controls.Heading Switch, but this cannot
be determined without looking at the procedure’s body and breaking modularity. One
way this situation could ameliorated would be to refactor the procedure into two differ-
ent procedures: one that reads in the value of the switches, and another that implements
the rest of the logic. For example,
procedure Control
is
. . .
begin
Read Controls Swintches ( Master Switch , Altitude Switch , Heading Switch );
Execute Control Logic ( Master Switch , Altitude Switch , Heading Switch );
end Control ;procedure Maintain ( Switch Pressed : in Controls . Switch ;
Present Altitude : in Instruments . Feet ;
Mach : in Instruments . Machnumber ;
Climb Rate : in Instruments . Feetpermin ;
The Pitch : in Instruments . Pitchangle )
− −# global in out Target Altitude ,
− −# Switch Pressed Before ,
− −# Pitch . State ;
− −# out Surfaces . Elevators ;
− −# derives Target Altitude
− −# from ∗,
− −# Switch Pressed ,
− −# Switch Pressed Before ,
− −# Present Altitude &
− −# Pitch . State
− −# from ∗,
− −# Switch Pressed ,
− −# The Pitch &
− −# Switch Pressed Before
− −# from
− −# Switch Pressed &
− −# Surfaces . Elevators
− −# from Switch Pressed ,
− −# Switch Pressed Before ,
− −# Target Altitude ,
− −# Present Altitude ,
− −# Mach ,
− −# Climb Rate ,
− −# The Pitch ,
− −# Pitch . State
− −# ;
is
begin
case Switch Pressed is
when Controls .On = >
case Switch Pressed Before is
when Controls . Off = >
Target Altitude := Present Altitude ;
when Controls .On = >
null ;
end case ;
Pitch . Pitch AP ( Present Altitude , Target Altitude ,Mach , Climb Rate , The Pitch );
when Controls . Off = >
null ;
end case ;
Switch Pressed Before := Switch Pressed ;
end Maintain ;
Fig.16. Original SPARK speciﬁcation for procedure Altitude.Maintain from the autopi-
lot code base.
where Read Controls Switches simply performs the top three procedure calls in
Control,andtherestofthefunctionalityisimplementedin Execute Control Logic.
Then the conditional information ﬂow speciﬁcations of Control would be exposed in
the procedure Execute Control Logic.
Anotheroptionwouldbetoexploitotherannotationsinthecode(likepost-conditions
and/or assertions) to avoid un-necessary generalizations. For example, if the procedure
Controls.Read Heading Switch had the following annotation:
procedure Read Heading Switch ( Heading Switch )
− −# post : Heading Switch = Controls . Heading Switch ;
thenfromthisannotationwecoulddetermineexactlywhatthevalueof Heading Switch
is in the post-condition (Controls.Heading Switch), and perform a direct substitu-
tion in the condition expressions instead of having to drop them. These are all options
that we are considering for future versions of the tool.
Nextproceduretodiscussis Altitude.Maintain,whichiscalledfrom AP.Control.
This is the ﬁrst procedure in our study of the Autopilot that has generates conditional
speciﬁcations. The original SPARK annotations as well as the code are displayed in
Fig. 16, and the annotations generated by our tool are presented in Fig. 17. The purpose
of this procedureis to maintain thealtitude of the airplanedepending on the current con-
ﬁguration of the autopilot, so there are quite a few cases this procedure has to handle,
which is why we get several conditional information ﬂow speciﬁcations.procedure Maintain ( Switch Pressed : in Controls . Switch ;
Present Altitude : in Instruments . Feet ;
Mach : in Instruments . Machnumber ;
Climb Rate : in Instruments . Feetpermin ;
The Pitch : in Instruments . Pitchangle );
− −# derives Target Altitude
− −# from ∗ when ( not Switch Pressed = Controls .On) ,
− −# Switch Pressed ,
− −# Switch Pressed Before when ( Switch Pressed = Controls .On) ,
− −# Present Altitude
− −# when ( Switch Pressed = Controls .On and Switch Pressed Before = Controls . Off ) ,
− −# ∗ when ( Switch Pressed = Controls .On and ( not Switch Pressed Before = Controls . Off )) &
− −# Pitch . Rate . Pitch History
− −# from {∗, The Pitch} when ( Switch Pressed = Controls .On) ,
− −# Switch Pressed ,
− −# ∗ when ( not Switch Pressed = Controls .On) &
− −# Switch Pressed Before
− −# from
− −# Switch Pressed &
− −# Surfaces . Elevators
− −# from Switch Pressed ,
− −# {Switch Pressed Before ,
− −# Present Altitude ,
− −# Mach ,
− −# Climb Rate ,
− −# The Pitch ,
− −# Pitch . Rate . Pitch History} when ( Switch Pressed = Controls .On) ,
− −# Target Altitude
− −# when ( Switch Pressed = Controls .On and ( not Switch Pressed Before = Controls . Off )) ,
− −# Present Altitude
− −# when ( Switch Pressed = Controls .On and Switch Pressed Before = Controls . Off ) ,
− −# Surfaces . Elevators when ( not Switch Pressed = Controls .On)
− −# ;
Fig.17. Results of running tool on procedure Altitude.Maintain from the autopilot code
base.
Here again we have a case in which it is extremely beneﬁtial to have conditional
information ﬂow contracts. The information ﬂow contracts in this example not only
describe the information ﬂow channel presents, but also the conditions under which
they are active, revealing details of the control logic of the system. Not only that, in this
particular example, the details of the control logic revealed actually give a good insight
of the actual functionality of the procedure.
Let us start by looking at the ﬂow speciﬁcations for Target Altitude. We can see
that Target Altitude derives either derives its new value from Present Altitude,
oritkeepsfromitsownpreviousvalue.Wecanseethatthedependenceson Switch Pressed
and Switch Pressed Before are simply control dependences, as these are the vari-
ables that appear in the conditions. Switch Pressed contains the state of the altitude
switch, passed as an argument, and Switch Pressed Before is a global used to store
the state of Switch Pressed in the previous state.
So,underwhatconditionsisthevalueof Target Altitudemodiﬁedusing Present Altitude?
Looking at the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, we can see that whenever Switch Pressed is OFF,
Target Altitude’s new value is derived from itself. Now we have two interesting
cases. If Switch Pressed is ON, but Switch Pressed Before is OFF (i.e., the
value of Switch Pressed in the previous state was OFF) then Target Altitude
derives gets its new value derived from Present Altitude. On the other hand, if
Switch PressedisONand Switch Pressed BeforeisOFF,then Target Altitude
gets its new value derived from itself. So basically here we have exposed the logic of
the altitude control system: when the altitude switch transitions from OFF to ON, the
target altitude (the altitude at which the plane will be automatically maintained) is set
to the present altitude, after that initial transition the target altitude does not change
(transition from ON to ON), unless the system transitions again from OFF to ON. So
Switch Pressed Before is basically used to detect the transitions from OFF to ON
and set the target altitude. A similar analysis applied to the information ﬂow speciﬁca-
tions for Surfaces.Elevators.procedure Pitch AP ( Present Altitude : in Instruments . Feet ;
Target Altitude : in Instruments . Feet ;
Mach : in Instruments . Machnumber ;
Climb Rate : in Instruments . Feetpermin ;
The Pitch : in Instruments . Pitchangle )
− −# global in out Rate . Pitch History ;
− −# out Surfaces . Elevators ;
− −# derives Rate . Pitch History
− −# from ∗,
− −# The Pitch &
− −# Surfaces . Elevators
− −# from Rate . Pitch History ,
− −# Present Altitude ,
− −# Target Altitude ,
− −# Mach ,
− −# Climb Rate ,
− −# The Pitch
− −# ;
is
Present Pitchrate : Degreespersec ;
Target Pitchrate : Degreespersec ;
Elevator Movement : Surfaces . Controlangle ;
begin
Calc Pitchrate ( The Pitch , Present Pitchrate );
Target Pitchrate := Target Rate ( Present Altitude , Target Altitude , Climb Rate );
Elevator Movement := Calc Elevator Move ( Present Pitchrate , Target Pitchrate , Mach );
Surfaces . Move Elevators ( Elevator Movement );
end Pitch AP ;
Fig.18. Original SPARK speciﬁcation for procedure AP.Altitude.Pitch AP from the
autopilot code base.
procedure Pitch AP ( Present Altitude : in Instruments . Feet ;
Target Altitude : in Instruments . Feet ;
Mach : in Instruments . Machnumber ;
Climb Rate : in Instruments . Feetpermin ;
The Pitch : in Instruments . Pitchangle )
− −# derives Rate . Pitch History
− −# from ∗,
− −# The Pitch &
− −# Surfaces . Elevators
− −# from Rate . Pitch History ,
− −# Present Altitude ,
− −# Target Altitude ,
− −# Mach ,
− −# Climb Rate ,
− −# The Pitch
− −# ;
is
Present Pitchrate : Degreespersec ;
Target Pitchrate : Degreespersec ;
Elevator Movement : Surfaces . Controlangle ;
begin
Calc Pitchrate ( The Pitch , Present Pitchrate );
Target Pitchrate := Target Rate ( Present Altitude , Target Altitude , Climb Rate );
Elevator Movement := Calc Elevator Move ( Present Pitchrate , Target Pitchrate , Mach );
Surfaces . Move Elevators ( Elevator Movement );
end Pitch AP ;
Fig.19. Results of running tool on procedure AP.Altitude.Pitch AP from the autopilot
code base.
Now let us examine procedure Altitude.Pitch.Pitch AP which is called from
Altitude.Maintain. The original SPARK annotations as well as the code can be
seen in Fig. 18, and the results of our tool are presented in Fig. 19. This example is
actually relatively simple, and as seen by looking at the ﬁgures the results of our tool
are exactly the same as the original SPARK annotations. As Pitch AP’s purpose is just
to update a set of variables, depending on its input, there is really no conditional infor-
mation ﬂow behavior in this procedure. This is the procedure sets the pitch, depending
on the values of the present and target altitude. What is interesting about this procedure
is that it calls a SPARK function, which is the one we look at next.
To conclude we look at a couple of SPARK functions, which are the bottom of this
call chain in Autopilot. The reason we look at this functions is to discuss a couple of
relevant concepts in the computation of the annotations relevant to functions, which
are not issues in the original SPARK. The functions are Target Rate, which is calledfunction Target Rate ( Present Altitude : Instruments . Feet ;
Target Altitude : Instruments . Feet ;
Climb Rate : Instruments . Feetpermin )
return Degreespersec
− −# derives @result
− −# from {},
− −# Climb Rate ,
− −# Present Altitude ,
− −# Target Altitude
− −# ;
is
Target Climb Rate : Floorfpm ;
Floor Climb Rate : Floorfpm ;
Result : Degreespersec ;
begin
Target Climb Rate := Target ROC ( Present Altitude , Target Altitude );
if Climb Rate > Floorfpm ’ Last then
Floor Climb Rate := Floorfpm ’ Last ;
e l s i f Climb Rate < Floorfpm ’ First then
Floor Climb Rate := Floorfpm ’ First ;
else
Floor Climb Rate := Climb Rate ;
end if ;
− −# assert Floor Climb Rate in Floorfpm and
− −# Target Climb Rate in Floorfpm ;
Result := Degreespersec ( ( Target Climb Rate − Floor Climb Rate ) / 12);
if ( Result > 10) then
Result := 10;
e l s i f ( Result < −10) then
Result := −10;
end if ;
return Result ;
end Target Rate ;
Fig.20. Results of running tool on function AP.Altitude.Target Rate from the autopilot
code base.
function Target ROC ( Present Altitude : Instruments . Feet ;
Target Altitude : Instruments . Feet )
return Floorfpm
− −# derives @result
− −# from {}
− −# when (( Target Altitude − Present Altitude ) / 10 < Floorfpm ’ First
− −# and not (( Target Altitude − Present Altitude ) / 10 > Floorfpm ’ Last )) ,
− −# {}
− −# when (( Target Altitude − Present Altitude ) / 10 > Floorfpm ’ Last ) ,
− −# Target Altitude ,
− −# Present Altitude
− −# ;
is
Result : Instruments . Feetpermin ;
begin
Result := Instruments . Feetpermin ( Integer ( Target Altitude − Present Altitude ) / 10);
if ( Result > Floorfpm ’ Last ) then
Result := Floorfpm ’ Last ;
e l s i f Result < Floorfpm ’ First then
Result := Floorfpm ’ First ;
end if ;
return Result ;
end Target ROC ;
Fig.21. Results of running tool on function AP.Altitude.Target ROC from the autopilot
code base.
from Pitch AP, and Target ROC, which is called from Target Rate. The code for
these functions, and the annotations obtained with our tool are presented in Fig. 20 and
Fig. 21, respectively.
The main thing to observe in these functions is the annotations. In SPARK, func-
tions do not have derives annotations. In fact, information ﬂow is not computed for
functions. The information ﬂow for a function in SPARK is straightforward: whatever
value is computed by the function depends on its inputs. However, in our case, we com-
pute conditional information ﬂow contracts. Some functions might actually give rise to
conditions, e.g., different values might be computed depending on conditiones calcu-
lated from the inputs. So, we need to be able to compute conditional information ﬂows
on functions. Morover, because we insist in modular analysis, we need to be able to
attach conditional derives annotations to functions, as shown in Fig. 20 and Fig. 21.In order to be able to specify conditional information ﬂow for functions, we need to
be able to talk about the value computed by the function. We deﬁne a special variable
@result, which denotes the value returned by the function, and we compute depen-
dences for this special variable. In the case of Target Rate we do not have conditional
information ﬂow speciﬁcations, but in the case of Target ROC we do have a couple of
conditional ﬂows. However, these two conditional ﬂows are constant ﬂows, and as such
they disappear in Target Rate. The main point we want to present here is the need for
information ﬂow speciﬁcations for SPARK functions, and the way we implement those
in our adaptation of SPARK.
7 Related Work
The theoretical framework for the SPARK information ﬂow framework is provided by
Bergeretti and Carr´ e [11] who presents a compositional method for inferring and check-
ing dependences [13] among variables. That approach is ﬂow-sensitive, whereas most
security type systems [31,6] are ﬂow-insensitive as they rely on assigning a security
level(“high”or“low”)toeachvariable.ChapmanandHilton[12]describehowSPARK
information ﬂow contracts could be extended with lattices of security levels and how
the SPARK Examiner could be enhanced to check conformance of ﬂows to particular
security levels. Those ideas could be applied directly to provide security levels of ﬂows
in our framework. Rossebo et al.[25] show how the existing SPARK framework can be
applied to verify various unconditional properties of a MILS Message Router. Apart
from Spark Ada, there exists several tools for analyzing information ﬂow properties,
notably Jif (Java + information ﬂow) which is based on [22]), and Flow Caml [27].
The seminal work on agreement assertions is [3], whose logic is ﬂow-sensitive,
and comes with an algorithm for computing (weakest) preconditions, but the approach
does not integrate with programmer assertions. To address that, and to analyze heap-
manipulating languages, the logic of [2] employs three kinds of primitive assertions:
agreement, programmer, and region (for a simple alias analysis). But, since those can
be combined only through conjunction, programmer assertions are not smoothly inte-
grated, and it is not possible to capture conditional information ﬂows. That was what
motivated Amtoft & Banerjee [5] to introduce conditional agreement assertions, for a
heap-manipulating language. This paper integrates that approach into the SPARK set-
ting for practical industrial development, adds interprocedural contract-based composi-
tion checking, adds an algorithm for computing loop invariants (rather than assuming
they are provided by the user), and provides an implementation as well as reports on
experiments.
A recently popular approach to information ﬂow analysis is self-composition, ﬁrst
proposed by Barthe et al. [9] and later extended by, e.g., Terauchi and Aiken [29] and
(for heap-manipulating programs) Naumann [23]. Self-composition works as follows:
for a given program S, a copy S0 is created with all variables renamed (primed); with
the observable variables say x,y, then non-interference holds provided the sequential
composition S;S0 when given precondition x = x0 ∧y = y0 also ensures postcondition
x = x0 ∧ y = y0. This is a property that can be checked using existing veriﬁers like
BLAST [19], Spec# [8], or ESC/Java2 [14]. Darvas et al. [1] use the KeY tool for
interactive veriﬁcation of non-interference; information ﬂow is modeled by a dynamic
logic formula, rather than by assertions as in self-composition.When it comes to conditional information ﬂow, the most noteworthy existing tool
is the slicer by Snelting et al [28] which generates path conditions in program depen-
dence graphs for reasoning about end-to-end ﬂows between speciﬁed program points/-
variables. In contrast, we provide a contract-based approach for compositional reason-
ing about conditions on ﬂows with an underlying logic representation that can provide
external evidence for conformance to conditional ﬂow properties. We have recently re-
ceived the implementation of the approach in [28], and we are currently investigating
the deeper technical connections between the two approaches.
Finally, we have already noted how our work has been inspired by and aims to
complement previous ground-breaking efforts in certiﬁcation of MILS infrastructure
[16,18]. While the direct theorem-proving approach followed in these efforts enables
proofs of very strong properties beyond what our framework can currently handle, our
aim is to dramatically reduce the labor required, and the potential for error, by integrat-
ing automated techniques directly on code, models, and developer workﬂows to allow
many information ﬂow veriﬁcation obligations to be discharged earlier in the life cycle.
8 Conclusion
We have presented what we believe to be an effective and developer-friendly frame-
work for speciﬁcation and automatic checking of conditional information ﬂow proper-
ties, which are central to veriﬁcation and certiﬁcation of information applications built
according to the MILS architecture. The directions that we are pursuing are inspired
directly by challenge problems presented to us by industry teams using SPARK for
MILS component development. The initial prototyping and evaluation of our frame-
work has produced promising results, and we are pressing ahead with evaluating our
techniques against actual product codebases developed at Rockwell Colins. A crucial
concern in this effort will be to develop design and implementation methodologies for
(a) exposing and checking conditional information ﬂows and (b) specifying and check-
ing security levels of data along conditional ﬂows. We believe that our framework will
nicely integrate with work on conditional declassiﬁcation/degrading.
While our framework already supports many of the language features of SPARK
and the extension to almost all other features (e.g., records) is straightforward, the pri-
mary remaining challenge is the effective treatment of arrays, which are often used in
SPARK to implement complex data structures. Rockwell Collins developers are facing
signiﬁcant frustrations because SPARK treats arrays as atomic entities, i.e., it does not
support even unconditional speciﬁcation and checking of ﬂows in/out of speciﬁc array
components. This report contains some ﬁrst steps towards building a theory for a more
precise handling of conditional information ﬂow for array components, but we still need
to integrate it with the treatment of while loops and procedure calls, incorporate it in our
implementation, and develop appropriate enhancements of SPARK contract notations.
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A Proofs of Technical Results
Proof of Lemma 1
We ﬁrst state some auxiliary facts that allow us to remove the nonpure part of array ex-
pressions, replacing them by case analyses of the actual index. To formalize the notion
“part of”, we introduce evaluation contexts C by the syntax
C ::= bc | C op A | A op C | h[C]
We write CbAc ∈ AExp for the result of plugging A into context C.
Fact 7 If A is not pure, then A is of the form CbH[A0]c with H not a variable.
Fact 8 For all C, A, A2, bop: CbZ[A]c bop A2 is 1-equivalent to Cb0c bop A2.
Fact 9 For all C, H, A0, A0, A, A2, bop: CbH{A0 : A0}[A]cbopA2 is 1-equivalent
to (A = A0 → CbA0c bop A2) ∧ (A 6= A0 → CbH[A]c bop A2)
Lemma 1 Given φ, we can construct pure φ0 such that φ ≡1 φ0.
Proof: We deﬁne a measure Q on 1Assert by stipulating that Q(φ) = (j,k1,k2) if
either φ is pure and j = k1 = k2 = 0, or φ contains at least one impure arithmetic
expression of size j but no impure arithmetic expression of size greater than j, and φ
contains k1 boolean expressions A1 bop A2 with A1 impure of size j, and φ contains
k2 boolean expressions A1 bop A2 with A2 impure of size j. We now impose an order
on 1Assert by stipulating that φ ≺ φ0 iff, with Q(φ) = (j,k1,k2) and Q(φ0) =
(j0,k0
1,k0
2), either j < j0, or j = j0 and k1 < k0
1, or j = j0 and k1 = k0
1 and k2 < k0
2.
Given impure φ, with Q(φ) = (j,k1,k2), φ contains A1 bop A2 such that either A1
or A2 is impure and of size j. We shall now show how to transform φ, by replacing
A1 bop A2 with an equivalent assertion, into an 1-equivalent assertion φ0 with φ0 ≺ φ.
Since ≺ is clearly a well-founded ordering, this will yield the claim.
If A1 is impure and of size j, it is (Fact 7) of the form CbH[A]c with H not an
array variable. If H is Z, we can apply Fact 8 to replace A1 bop A2 in φ. If H is of
the form H{A0 : A0}, we can apply Fact 9 to replace A1 bop A2 in φ. In both cases,
we end up with a φ0 which is 1-equivalent to φ and which satisﬁes φ0 ≺ φ, since with
Q(φ0) = (j0,k0
1,k0
2) we have either j0 < j (if A1 was the only impure arithmetic
expression of size j) or k0
1 < k1.If A2 is impure and of size j, but A1 is not, then A2 is of the form CbH[A]c with
H not an array variable. If H is Z we can apply (the symmetric version of) Fact 8 to
replace A1 bopA2 in φ. If H is of the form H{A0 : A0}, we can apply (the symmetric
version of) Fact 9 to replace A1 bop A2 in φ. In both cases, we end up with a φ0 which
is 1-equivalent to φ and which clearly satisﬁes φ0 ≺ φ, since with Q(φ0) = (j0,k0
1,k0
2)
we have either j0 < j (if A2 was the only impure arithmetic expression of size j) or
j0 = j and k0
1 = k1 and k0
2 < k0
2. 2
Deﬁnition of rm+
We deﬁne rm+, having the property that if φ0 = rm
+
X(φ) then φ0 does not contain
any variables from X, and is logically implied by φ, simultaneously with its dual rm−
which has the property that if φ0 = rm
−
X(φ) then φ0 does not contain any variables
from X, and logically implies φ.
rm
+
X(B) = true if fv(B) ∩ X 6= ∅ rm
−
X(B) = false if fv(B) ∩ X 6= ∅
rm
+
X(B) = B if fv(B) ∩ X = ∅ rm
−
X(B) = B if fv(B) ∩ X = ∅
rm
+
X(φ1 ∧ φ2) = rm
+
X(φ1) ∧ rm
+
X(φ2) rm
−
X(φ1 ∧ φ2) = rm
−
X(φ1) ∧ rm
−
X(φ2)
rm
+
X(φ1 ∨ φ2) = rm
+
X(φ1) ∨ rm
+
X(φ2) rm
−
X(φ1 ∨ φ2) = rm
−
X(φ1) ∨ rm
−
X(φ2)
rm
+
X(¬φ0) = ¬rm
−
X(φ0) rm
−
X(¬φ0) = ¬rm
+
X(φ0)
Some results about substitution
Lemma 10. For all E, A, s, x, with v = [[A]]s and with s0 = [s | x7→v], we have
[[E[A/x]]]s = [[E]]s0.
Proof: Structural induction on E. If E is a constant c, then both sides evaluate to c.
If E is the array constant Z, then both sides evaluate to λn.0. If E equals x, both
sides evaluate to v. If E is a scalar variable y with y 6= x, then both sides evaluate
to s(y). If E is an array variable h, then both sides evaluate to s(h). If E is of the
form A1 op A2 or A1 bop A2, the claim follows easily from the induction hypothesis.
If E is of the form H[A0], the left hand side evaluates to [[H[A/x]]]s([[A0[A/x]]]s)
while the right hand side evaluates to [[H]]s0([[A0]]s0); the equality now follows from
the induction hypothesis. If E is of the form H{A0 : A0}, the left hand side evaluates
to [[[H[A/x]]]s | [[A0[A/x]]]s 7→ [[A0[A/x]]]s] whereas the right hand side evaluates to
[[[H]]s0 | [[A0]]s0 7→[[A0]]s0]; the equality now follows from the induction hypothesis. 2
Lemma 11. For all E, H, s, h, with a = [[H]]s and with s0 = [s | h7→a], we have
[[E[H/h]]]s = [[E]]s0.
Proof: Structural induction on E. If E is a constant c, then both sides evaluate to c.
If E is the array constant Z, then both sides evaluate to λn.0. If E is a scalar variable
x, then both sides evaluate to s(x). If E equals h, then both sides evaluate to a. If E
is an array variable h1 with h1 6= h, then both sides evaluate to s(h1). If E is of the
form A1 op A2 or A1 bop A2, the claim follows easily from the induction hypothesis.
If E is of the form H0[A], the left hand side evaluates to [[H0[H/h]]]s([[A[H/h]]]s)
while the right hand side evaluates to [[H0]]s0([[A]]s0); the equality now follows from theinduction hypothesis. If E is of the form H0{A0 : A0}, the left hand side evaluates
to [[[H0[H/h]]]s | [[A0[H/h]]]s 7→[[A0[H/h]]]s] whereas the right hand side evaluates to
[[[H0]]s0 | [[A0]]s0 7→[[A0]]s0]; the equality now follows from the induction hypothesis. 2
Lemma 12. For all φ, A, s, x, with v = [[A]]s and with s0 = [s | x7→v], we have
s |= φ[A/x] iff s0 |= φ.
Proof: Structural induction in φ, with a case analysis on the form of φ. If φ is some
boolean expression B, the claim follows directly from Lemma 10. Otherwise, for in-
stance when φ is of the form φ1 ∧ φ2, the claim follows easily from the induction
hypothesis. 2
Lemma 13. For all φ, H, s, h, with a = [[H]]s and with s0 = [s | h7→a], we have
s |= φ[H/h] iff s0 |= φ.
Proof: As the proof of Lemma 12, using Lemma 11 rather than Lemma 10. 2
Some results about the analysis of while loops
We consider the algorithm in Fig. 7, the clause for while loops.
Lemma 14. For all w, and for all i,i0 with i ≤ i0, we have φi
w B1 φi
0
w.
Proof: Follows from property (a) of the 5 operator. 2
Lemma 15. For all i,i0 with i ≤ i0, we have Θi
0
B2 Θi.
Proof: Follows from Lemma 14, by the contravariance result in Lemma 2. 2
Lemma 16. The number j is well-deﬁned, and for all i ≥ j and all w ∈ X, φi
w = φj
w.
Proof: Due to property (b) of the 5 operator, for each w ∈ X the chain {φi
w | i ≥ 0}
contains only a ﬁnite number of elements; the claim now follows since X is ﬁnite.
(Note that if we would allow individual array elements to appear as consequents of
loop invariants, we would operate with a set X that is essentially inﬁnite, and we might
need widening to eventually replace, say, h[x] by h.) 2
Lemma 17. In Fig. 7, the clause for while loops, we have Θ0 B2 Θ0.
Proof: Assume that s&s1 |= Θ0, and let (φ ⇒ En) ∈ Θ0 be given; assuming s |= φ
and s1 |= φ, our task is to show [[E]]s = [[E]]s1 where it sufﬁces to prove that for an
arbitrary w ∈ fv(E), s(w) = s1(w). By construction of φ0
w, φ logically implies φ0
w,
and thus s |= φ0
w and s1 |= φ0
w. From (φ0
w ⇒ wn) ∈ Θ0 and s&s1 |= Θ0 we now
infer the desired s(w) = s1(w). 2
Lemma 18. In Fig. 7, the clause for while loops, if Θ0
m 6= ∅ then Θ B2 Θj.
Proof: If Θ0
m 6= ∅ then Θj ⊆ dom(Rm) ⊆ Θ which yields the claim. 2
Lemma 19. In Fig. 7, the clause for while loops, for all i we have Θi+1 B2 dom(Ri).
Proof: Assume that s&s1 |= Θi+1, and let (φ ⇒ En) ∈ dom(Ri) be given; assuming
s |= φ and s1 |= φ, our task is to show [[E]]s = [[E]]s1 where it sufﬁces to prove that
for an arbitrary w ∈ fv(E), s(w) = s1(w). Since (φ ⇒ En, , ) ∈ Ri, we see from
the construction of ψi
w that φ logically implies ψi
w, which by construction logically
implies φi+1
w . Thus s |= φi+1
w and s1 |= φi+1
w , so from (φi+1
w ⇒ wn) ∈ Θi+1 and
s&s1 |= Θi+1 we infer the desired s(w) = s1(w). 2Proof of Lemma 5
Lemma 5 Assume {Θ} (R)⇐= S {Θ0} . Then
Totality dom(R) = Θ (left totality) and ran(R) = Θ0 (right totality).
Uniqueness Given θ0 ∈ Θ0, there exists at most one θ such that (θ,u,θ0) ∈ R.
Write Conﬁnement If (θ,u,θ0) ∈ R, then con(θ) = con(θ0), and with E = con(θ)
we have that if s [[S]] s0 then s agrees with s0 on fv(E).
Proof: The proof is by induction in S, with a case analysis on the form of S where we
shall use the terminology from Fig. 7.
S = skip or S = assert(φ0). The claims are all trivial.
S = x := A or S = h := new or S = h[A0] := A0. Left Totality follows from the con-
struction of Θ, while Right Totality follows from the construction of R. Uniqueness is
trivial since for each θ0 ∈ Θ0 there exists exactly one θ with (θ, ,θ0) ∈ R.
For Write Conﬁnement, assume (θ,u,θ0) ∈ R with E = con(θ0).
– If S is of the form x := A, then x / ∈ fv(E). Therefore con(θ) = E, and if s [[S]] s0
then s agrees with s0 except on x, in particular they agree on fv(E).
– Otherwise, h / ∈ fv(E). Therefore con(θ) = E, and if s [[S]] s0 then s agrees with
s0 except on h, in particular they agree on fv(E).
S = S1 ;S2. The induction hypothesis obviously gives us Totality and Uniqueness. For
Write Conﬁnement, assume that (θ,u,θ0) ∈ R; this happens because there exists θ00
with (θ,u,θ00) ∈ R1 and (θ00,u,θ0) ∈ R2. With E = con(θ0), inductively we infer ﬁrst
E = con(θ00) and next E = con(θ). Finally, assume that s [[S]] s0; then there exists s00
suchthats [[S1]] s00 ands00 [[S2]] s0.Givenw ∈ fv(E),wemustshowthats(w) = s0(w),
but this follows since inductively we have s(w) = s00(w) and s00(w) = s0(w).
S = if B then S1 else S2. Uniqueness follows easily from the induction hypothe-
sis, and Left Totality follows from the construction of Θ. For Right Totality, con-
sider θ0 ∈ Θ0. If θ0 ∈ Θ0
m then the claim follows, due to R0
1, since inductively we
can assume that R1 is total. If θ0 ∈ Θ0
u then we infer inductively that there exists
θ1,θ2 such that (θ1,u,θ0) ∈ R1 and (θ2,u,θ0) ∈ R2; we also infer inductively that
con(θ1) = con(θ0) = con(θ2). But this shows, due to R0, that there exists θ with
(θ,u,θ0) ∈ R.
We now address Write Conﬁnement, and consider (θ,u,θ0) ∈ R, that is (θ,u,θ0) ∈
R0 with θ0 ∈ Θ0
u. Thus there exists (θ1,u,θ0) ∈ R1 and (θ2,u,θ0) ∈ R2 with con(θ) =
con(θ1) = con(θ2). Inductively, we infer that con(θ1) = con(θ0) and hence con(θ) =
con(θ0). Finally, assume that s [[S]] s0 where we can assume, wlog., that s |= B and
s [[S1]] s0. Given w ∈ fv(E), with E = con(θ), we must show that s(w) = s0(w), but
this follows from the induction hypothesis.
S = call p. Uniqueness is obvious from the construction of R, and Left Totality from
the construction of Θ. To show Right Totality, assume that θ0 = (φ ⇒ En) ∈ Θ0:
if fv(E) ∩ OUTp = ∅ then θ0 ∈ ran(Ru) ⊆ ran(R); if fv(E) ∩ OUTp 6= ∅ then
θ0 ∈ ran(Rm) ⊆ ran(R) since each postcondition has at least one precondition, cf. Re-
quirement 4 on p. 14.
We now address Write Conﬁnement, and consider (θ,u,θ0) ∈ R, that is (θ,u,θ0) ∈
Ru. We see that there exists E such that con(θ0) = E = con(θ). Finally, assumethat s [[S]] s0, that is s P(p) s0, and let w ∈ fv(E) be given; we must show that
s(w) = s0(w). But from the construction of Ru we infer that w / ∈ OUTp, and the claim
now follows from Requirement 1 for summaries (p. 14).
S = while B do S0 od. Left Totality follows by construction of Θ. For Right Totality,
note that if θ0 ∈ Θ0 belongs to Θ0
m there exists at least one θ such that (θ,m,θ0) ∈ Rm;
otherwise, if θ0 ∈ Θ0
u, there exists exactly one θ (determined by the form of con(θ))
such that (θ,u,θ0) ∈ Ru. The latter observation also shows Uniqueness.
For Write Conﬁnement, assume that (θ,u,θ0) ∈ R, that is θ0 ∈ Θ0
u and con(θ) = E
where E = con(θ0). Now consider w ∈ fv(E), and assume that s [[S]] s0; we must
prove that s(w) = s0(w). By the deﬁnition of Θ0
u we infer that Rj does not contain any
element of the form ( ,m, ⇒ wn). We now apply the induction hypothesis to S0, and
the call { } (Rj)⇐= S0 {Θj} , ﬁrst inferring from Right Totality that Rj contains an
element of the form ( ,u, ⇒ wn), and next inferring from Write Conﬁnement that if
s0 [[S0]] s0
0 then s0(w) = s0
0(w). With fi as deﬁned in Fig. 5, it is now easy to show by
induction in i that if s fi s0 then s(w) = s0(w). But this establishes Write Conﬁnement.
2
Proof of Lemma 6
Lemma 6 Assume {Θ} (R) ⇐= S {Θ0} . Given θ0 ∈ Θ0, there exists (θ, ,θ0) ∈ R
such that whenever s [[S]] s0 and s0 |= ant(θ0) then s |= ant(θ).
Proof: The proof is by induction in S, with a case analysis on the form of S where we
shall use the terminology from Fig. 7.
S = skip. Trivial.
S = assert(φ0).Givenθ0 ∈ Θ0,thereexists(θ, ,θ0) ∈ Rsuchthatant(θ) = ant(θ0)∧
φ0. This does the job: assume s [[S]] s0, which amounts to s |= φ0 and s0 = s, and that
s0 |= ant(θ0); then clearly s |= ant(θ).
S = x := A. Given θ0 ∈ Θ0, there exists (θ, ,θ0) ∈ R such that with φ = ant(θ) and
φ0 = ant(θ0) we have φ = φ0[A/x]. This does the job: assume s [[S]] s0, which amounts
to s0 = [s | x7→v] where v = [[A]]s, and that s0 |= φ0; then by Lemma 12, we have the
desired s |= φ.
S = h := new. Given θ0 ∈ Θ0, there exists (θ, ,θ0) ∈ R such that with φ = ant(θ)
and φ0 = ant(θ0) we have φ = φ0[Z/h]. This does the job: assume s [[S]] s0, which
amounts to s0 = [s | h7→λn.0], that is s0 = [s | h7→[[Z]]s]. If also s0 |= φ0, then by
Lemma 13 we have the desired s |= φ.
S = h[A0] := A0. Given θ0 ∈ Θ0, there exists (θ, ,θ0) ∈ R such that with φ = ant(θ)
and φ0 = ant(θ0) we have φ = φ0[h{A0 : A0}/h]. This does the job: assume s [[S]] s0,
which amounts to s0 = [s | h(n) 7→ v] with n = [[A0]]s and v = [[A0]]s, that is s0 =
[s | h7→a] where a = [[h{A0 : A0}]]s. If also s0 |= φ0, then by Lemma 13 we have the
desired s |= φ.
S = S1 ;S2. Given θ0 ∈ Θ0, inductively on S2 we can ﬁnd (θ00, ,θ0) ∈ R2 with the
property that if s00 [[S2]] s0 and s0 |= ant(θ0) then s00 |= ant(θ00), and inductively on S1
we can next ﬁnd (θ, ,θ00) ∈ R1 with the property that if s [[S1]] s00 and s00 |= ant(θ00)
then s |= ant(θ). Since (θ, ,θ0) ∈ R, our task can be accomplished by showing s |=ant(θ) from the assumptions s0 |= ant(θ0) and s [[S]] s0. The latter assumption implies
the existence of s00 with s00 [[S2]] s0 and s [[S1]] s00; from s0 |= ant(θ0) and the property
of S2 and θ00 we now infer s00 |= ant(θ00), and from the property of S1 and θ we next
infer the desired s |= ant(θ).
S = if B then S1 else S2. Given θ0 ∈ Θ0, inductively on S1 we can ﬁnd (θ1, ,θ0) ∈
R1 with the property that if s [[S1]] s0 and s0 |= ant(θ0) then s |= ant(θ), and in-
ductively on S2 we can ﬁnd (θ2, ,θ0) ∈ R2 with the property that if s [[S2]] s0 and
s0 |= ant(θ0) then s |= ant(θ). Let θ1 = (φ1 ⇒ E1n), let θ2 = (φ2 ⇒ E2n), and let
θ0 = (φ0 ⇒ En). We now ﬁrst deﬁne φ as (φ1 ∧B)∨(φ2 ∧¬B), and next deﬁne θ as
follows: if θ0 ∈ Θ0
m then we let θ = (φ ⇒ Bn) so that (θ, ,θ0) ∈ R0
0 ⊆ R; if θ0 ∈ Θ0
u,
in which case Lemma 5 tells us that E = E1 = E2, we let θ = (φ ⇒ En) so that
(θ, ,θ0) ∈ R0 ⊆ R. We must prove that θ thus constructed has the desired property,
so assume that s [[S]] s0 and s0 |= φ0 so as to prove s |= φ. Wlog. we may assume that
s |= B and thus s [[S1]] s0, in which case the property of S1 and θ1 tells us that s |= φ1
which together with s |= B implies the desired s |= φ.
S = call p. Given θ0 ∈ Θ0, and let φ0 = ant(θ0). We deﬁne φ = rm+
OUTp(φ0), and
assuming s [[S]] s0 and s0 |= φ0 we shall prove s |= φ: by the requirements to rm+ we
have s0 |= φ, and since fv(φ) ∩ OUTp = ∅ holds by construction of φ, we infer from
Requirement 1 for summaries (p. 14) that s(w) = s0(w) for all w ∈ fv(φ), yielding the
desired s |= φ.
It is thus sufﬁcient to show that R always contains a triple of the form (φ ⇒
n, ,θ0). But if fv(E) ∩ OUTp = ∅, this follows by the deﬁnition of Ru; otherwise, this
follows by the deﬁnition of Rm, together with Requirement 4 for summaries (p. 14).
S = while B do S0 od. Let θ0 ∈ Θ0 be given, with θ0 of the form φ0 ⇒ En. We
can assume θ0 ∈ Θ0
u, since otherwise we have (true ⇒ 0n,m,θ0) ∈ Rm ⊆ R and
the claim is trivial. We can also assume fv(E) 6= ∅, since otherwise we have (true ⇒
En,u,θ0) ∈ Ru ⊆ R and the claim is again trivial. With φ =
W
w∈fv(E) φj
w, it thus
holds that (φ ⇒ En,u,θ0) ∈ R.
Let w belong to fv(E). By construction of φ0
w, φ0 logically implies φ0
w which (by
Lemma 14) logically implies φj
w which logically implies φ. Therefore, it is sufﬁcient to
prove that if s [[S]] s0 and s0 |= φ then s |= φ. A simple inductive argument, on fi as
deﬁned in Fig. 5, now shows that it is sufﬁcient to prove that if s0 [[S0]] s0
0 and s0
0 |= φ
then s0 |= φ.
So assume s0 [[S0]] s0
0, and assume that s0
0 |= φ, implying that there exists w ∈
fv(E) such that s0
0 |= φj
w. We now apply the induction hypothesis on S0, and infer
from { } (Rj)⇐= S0 {Θj} that there exists (φ0 ⇒ E0n,γ,φj
w ⇒ wn) ∈ Rj such
that s0 |= φ0. From θ0 / ∈ Θ0
m we infer that γ = u, which by Lemma 5 implies E0 = w.
By construction of ψj
w, we see that φ0 logically implies ψj
w, and thus s0 |= ψj
w. By
deﬁnition of j, we have φj
w = φj+1
w , so from the deﬁnition of φi+1
w , we infer that ψj
w
logically implies φj
w. Thus s0 |= φj
w and hence the desired s0 |= φ. 2
Proof of Theorem 1
We need one more auxiliary result:
Lemma 20. In Fig. 7, the clause for while loops: if s&s1 |= Θj and [[B]]s 6= [[B]]s1
and s [[S0]] s0 then s0&s1 |= Θj.Proof: To prove the conclusion, let (φj
w ⇒ wn) ∈ Θj be given; assuming s0 |= φj
w
and s1 |= φj
w, we must prove s0(w) = s1(w). By Lemma 6 applied to { } (Rj) ⇐=
S0 {Θj} and our premise s [[S0]] s0, we see that Rj contains an element (φ ⇒
En,γ,φj
w ⇒ wn) where s |= φ. Here γ = u, as we shall show below.
Assume, to get a contradiction, that γ = m. It sufﬁces to show that for all z ∈ fv(B)
we have s(z) = s1(z), since then [[B]]s = [[B]]s1 which contradicts one of our premises.
So let z ∈ fv(B) be given; by construction of ψj
z we see from (φ ⇒ En,γ,φj
w ⇒
wn) ∈ Rj that that φ B1 ψj
z and φj
w B1 ψj
z; since ψj
z B1 φj+1
z and φj+1
z = φj
z this
implies s |= φj
z and s1 |= φj
z. From (φj
z ⇒ zn) ∈ Θj and s&s1 |= Θj we thus infer
the desired s(z) = s1(z).
We have showed that γ = u, so by Lemma 5 we infer that E = w, and that s(w) =
s0(w). By construction of ψi
w we see that φ B1 ψj
w, and hence also φ B1 φj
w. Thus we
have not just s1 |= φj
w but also s |= φj
w, so since s&s1 |= Θj with (φj
w ⇒ wn) ∈ Θj,
we infer s(w) = s1(w) and hence the desired s0(w) = s1(w). 2
Theorem 1 Assume that
1. {Θ} ( )⇐= S {Θ0}
2. s [[S]] s0 and s1 [[S]] s0
1
3. s&s1 |= Θ
Then s0&s0
1 |= Θ0.
Proof: The proof is by induction in S, with a case analysis on the form of S where we
shall use the terminology from Fig. 7.
S = skip. Trivial.
S = assert(φ0). We have s |= φ0, s1 |= φ0, s0 = s, and s0
1 = s1. Let (φ ⇒ En) ∈ Θ0
be given, and assume that s |= φ and s1 |= φ; we must prove [[E]]s = [[E]]s1. But
(φ ∧ φ0) ⇒ En ∈ Θ so from s&s1 |= Θ we have s&s1 |= (φ ∧ φ0) ⇒ En, and since
s |= φ ∧ φ0 and s1 |= φ ∧ φ0 this implies the desired [[E]]s = [[E]]s1.
S = S1 ;S2. There exists s00 and s00
1 such that s [[S1]] s00 and s00 [[S2]] s0 and s1 [[S1]] s00
1
and s00
1 [[S2]] s0
1. Given s&s1 |= Θ, we can apply the induction hypothesis to S1 to
give s00&s00
1 |= Θ00, and next apply the induction hypothesis to S2 to give the desired
s0&s0
1 |= Θ0.
S = x := A. Given θ0 = (φ0 ⇒ E0n) ∈ Θ0; assuming s0 |= φ0 and s0
1 |= φ0, we must
prove [[E0]]s0 = [[E0]]s0
1. Here s0 = [s | x7→v] with v = [[A]]s, and s0
1 = [s1 | x7→v1]
with v1 = [[A]]s1. With φ = φ0[A/x] and E = E0[A/x] we have φ ⇒ En ∈ Θ and
thus s&s1 |= φ ⇒ En. From s0 |= φ0 and s0
1 |= φ0 we infer by Lemma 12 that s |= φ
and s1 |= φ, implying [[E]]s = [[E]]s1. Since by Lemma 10 we have [[E0]]s0 = [[E]]s and
[[E0]]s0
1 = [[E]]s1, this amounts to the desired [[E0]]s0 = [[E0]]s0
1.
S = h := new. Given θ0 = (φ0 ⇒ E0n) ∈ Θ0; assuming s0 |= φ0 and s0
1 |= φ0, we
must prove [[E0]]s0 = [[E0]]s0
1. Here s0 = [s | h7→a] with a = [[Z]]s, and s0
1 = [s1 | h7→
a1] with a1 = [[Z]]s1. With φ = φ0[Z/h] and E = E0[Z/h] we have φ ⇒ En ∈ Θ and
thus s&s1 |= φ ⇒ En. From s0 |= φ0 and s0
1 |= φ0 we infer by Lemma 13 that s |= φ
and s1 |= φ, implying [[E]]s = [[E]]s1. Since by Lemma 11 we have [[E0]]s0 = [[E]]s and
[[E0]]s0
1 = [[E]]s1, this amounts to the desired [[E0]]s0 = [[E0]]s0
1.S = h[A0] := A0. Given θ0 = (φ0 ⇒ E0n) ∈ Θ0; assuming s0 |= φ0 and s0
1 |= φ0, we
must prove [[E0]]s0 = [[E0]]s0
1. Here s0 = [s | h(n)7→v] with n = [[A0]]s and v = [[A0]]s,
and thus s0 = [s | h7→a] with a = [[h{A0 : A0}]]s. Similarly, s0
1 = [s1 | h7→a1] with
a1 = [[h{A0 : A0}]]s1. With φ = φ0[h{A0 : A0}/h] and E = E0[h{A0 : A0}/h] we
have φ ⇒ En ∈ Θ and thus s&s1 |= φ ⇒ En. From s0 |= φ0 and s0
1 |= φ0 we infer
by Lemma 13 that s |= φ and s1 |= φ, implying [[E]]s = [[E]]s1. Since by Lemma 11 we
have [[E0]]s0 = [[E]]s and [[E0]]s0
1 = [[E]]s1, this amounts to the desired [[E0]]s0 = [[E0]]s0
1.
S = if B then S1 else S2. Except for symmetry, there are two cases. The ﬁrst case is
when [[B]]s = [[B]]s1 = True, in which case we have s [[S1]] s0 and s1 [[S1]] s0
1. It is
sufﬁcient to establish s&s1 |= Θ1, since then the desired s0&s0
1 |= Θ0 will follow by
induction on S1. So given (φ1 ⇒ E1n) ∈ Θ1, and assuming s |= φ1 and s1 |= φ1,
our obligation is to show [[E1]]s = [[E1]]s1. By Lemma 5 (Totality) applied to S1, there
exists θ0 ∈ Θ0 such that (φ1 ⇒ E1n, ,θ0) ∈ R1. Two cases:
– if θ0 ∈ Θ0
m then, by R0
1, (φ1 ∧ B ⇒ E1n) ∈ Θ.
– if θ0 ∈ Θ0
u then, by R0 and Lemma 5, there exists φ2 such that
(φ1 ∧ B) ∨ (φ2 ∧ ¬B) ⇒ E1n ∈ Θ.
Since s |= φ1 ∧ B and s1 |= φ1 ∧ B, and since s&s1 |= Θ, in both cases we can infer
the desired [[E1]]s = [[E1]]s1.
The second case to be considered is when [[B]]s = False but [[B]]s1 = True, in which
case we have s [[S2]] s0 and s1 [[S1]] s0
1. Given θ0 = (φ0 ⇒ En) ∈ Θ0, and assuming
s0 |= φ0 and s0
1 |= φ0, our proof obligation is to show [[E]]s0 = [[E]]s0
1.
We shall establish that θ0 ∈ Θ0
u, by showing that θ0 ∈ Θ0
m leads to a contradic-
tion: by Lemma 6 applied to S1 and S2, there exists (φ1 ⇒ n, ,θ0) ∈ R1 and
(φ2 ⇒ n, ,θ0) ∈ R2 such that s1 |= φ1 and s |= φ2. Due to R0
0 we see that
Θ contains (φ1 ∧ B) ∨ (φ2 ∧ ¬B) ⇒ Bn. Since s |= (φ1 ∧ B) ∨ (φ2 ∧ ¬B) and
s1 |= (φ1 ∧ B) ∨ (φ2 ∧ ¬B), from s&s1 |= Θ we infer [[B]]s = [[B]]s1. But this con-
tradicts our case assumption.
We have established θ0 ∈ Θ0
u. By Lemma 5 we now infer that there exists unique
θ ∈ Θ such that (θ, ,θ0) ∈ R and also that E = con(θ). By Lemma 6, with φ =
ant(θ), we infer that s |= φ and s1 |= φ. From s&s1 |= Θ we thus infer [[E]]s = [[E]]s1.
But since Lemma 5 also states that s,s0 agree on fv(E), and that s1,s0
1 agree on fv(E),
this amounts to the desired [[E]]s0 = [[E]]s0
1.
S = call p. We consider θ0 ∈ Θ0 of the form φ0 ⇒ En, and must prove s0&s0
1 |=
φ0 ⇒ En. So assume s0 |= φ0 and s0
1 |= φ0, in order to prove [[E]]s0 = [[E]]s0
1. Deﬁne
φ = rm+
OUTp(φ0) and observe, as in the proof of Lemma 6, that by the properties of rm+
we have ﬁrst s0 |= φ and s0
1 |= φ, and next (due to Requirement 1 for summaries) also
s |= φ and s1 |= φ.
We now have two cases, the ﬁrst one being when fv(E) ∩ OUTp = ∅, implying (by
Requirement 1 for summaries) that s,s0, and also s1,s0
1, agree on fv(E). By Ru we see
that φ ⇒ En ∈ Θ, so from s&s1 |= Θ we infer [[E]]s = [[E]]s1 which amounts to the
desired [[E]]s0 = [[E]]s0
1.
Next assume that fv(E) ∩ OUTp 6= ∅. Note that it is sufﬁcient to prove that for all
w ∈ fv(E), s0(w) = s0
1(w). So let w ∈ fv(E) be given, with two subcases: if w / ∈ OUTp
we see by R0 that φ ⇒ wn ∈ Θ, so from s&s1 |= Θ we infer s(w) = s1(w) which
(by Requirement 1 for summaries) amounts to the desired s0(w) = s0
1(w).
The last subcase is when w ∈ OUTp. Let Θw be the preconditions for wn in the
summary for p. It is sufﬁcient to prove s&s1 |= Θw, since the correctness of the sum-mary (requirement 5 on p.14) will then imply the desired s0(w) = s0
1(w). So consider
θ ∈ Θw, of the form φz
w ⇒ zn, and assume s |= φz
w and s1 |= φz
w so as to prove
s(z) = s1(z). From Rm we see that (φz
w ∧ φ) ⇒ zn ∈ Θ. But since s&s1 |= Θ is part
of our overall assumption, and since we have assumed s |= φz
w and s1 |= φz
w and have
already showed s |= φ and s1 |= φ, we can infer the desired s(z) = s1(z).
S = while B do S0 od. First we consider the case when Θ0
m = ∅. Let (φ0 ⇒ En) ∈
Θ0 be given; assuming s0 |= φ0 and s0
1 |= φ0, we must prove [[E]]s0 = [[E]]s0
1. There
exists exactly one element in R of the form (θ,γ,φ0 ⇒ En); here γ = u and θ is
of the form φ ⇒ En. By Lemma 5, applied to S, we know that [[E]]s = [[E]]s0 and
[[E]]s1 = [[E]]s0
1. By Lemma 6, applied to S, we have s |= φ and s1 |= φ. Since
(φ ⇒ En) ∈ Θ, we from s&s1 |= Θ infer [[E]]s = [[E]]s1 which amounts to the
desired [[E]]s0 = [[E]]s0
1.
Next we consider the case when Θ0
m 6= ∅. By Lemma 18 we then have Θ B2 Θj.
By Lemma 17 and Lemma 15 we also have Θj B2 Θ0. It is therefore enough to show
that, with fi as deﬁned in Fig. 5, that
if s fk s0 and s1 fk1 s0
1 and s&s1 |= Θj then s0&s0
1 |= Θj.
We shall do so by induction in k + k1, performing a case analysis.
– If k = k1 = 0, the claim is obvious as then s = s0, s1 = s0
1.
– If k > 0 and k1 > 0, then there exists s00,s00
1 such that s [[S0]] s00, s1 [[S0]] s00
1,
s00 fk−1 s0, s00
1 fk1−1 s0
1. By Lemma 19 we have Θj B2 dom(Rj), and therefore
s&s1 |= dom(Rj). The overall induction hypothesis, applied to S0 and the call
{Θ0} (Rj) ⇐= S0 {Θj} where (by Lemma 5) we have Θ0 = dom(Rj), now
tells us s00&s00
1 |= Θj. We can then apply the inner induction hypothesis to get the
desired s0&s0
1 |= Θj.
– Apart from symmetry, the only case left is when k > 0 but k1 = 0. Then [[B]]s =
True but [[B]]s1 = False, s0
1 = s1, and there exists s00 such that s [[S0]] s00 and
s00 fk−1 s0. By Lemma 20, we have s00&s1 |= Θj. We can now apply the inner
induction hypothesis to get the desired s0&s0
1 |= Θj.
2